The logic of Sir William Hamilton: tunnelling through sand to place the keystone in the Aristotelic Arch by Jessop, R.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jessop, R. (2008) The logic of Sir William Hamilton: tunnelling through 
sand to place the keystone in the Aristotelic Arch. In: Gabbay, D.M. and 
Woods, J. (eds.) British Logic in the Nineteenth Century. Handbook of 
the History of Logic, 4 . Elsevier, pp. 93-163. ISBN 0444516107 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/44056/ 
 
Deposited on: 21 April 2011 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
THE LOGIC OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON:
TUNNELLING THROUGH SAND TO PLACE
THE KEYSTONE IN THE
ARISTOTELIC ARCH
Ralph Jessop
1 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
Every learner in science, is now familiar with more truths than Aristo-
tle or Plato ever dreamt of knowing; yet, compared with the Stagirite
or the Athenian, how few, even of our masters of modern science, rank
higher than intellectual barbarians! (Hamilton, ‘Philosophy of Percep-
tion’, p. 40).1
The Enlightenment initiated the modern world as the product of a hitherto un-
surpassed devotion to reason and scepticism. The scientific successes, ideals of
progress, material advancement, hopes of social amelioration and freedom of the
Enlightenment, were accompanied by catastrophic failures, conspicuous atrocities
perpetrated in the name of reason and authority, and increasing fears of a dreadful
new age of barbarism. Several Western countries incurred massive rifts, upheavals,
wars, and profound societal changes that impinged upon or were feared to be the
results of Enlightened thought. Following the shock-waves of the American and
French revolutions, as some of the first effects of the industrial revolution were be-
ginning to be felt, divisions at the heart of the Enlightenment between reason and
scepticism resurfaced in varying guises in England, France, Germany, and Scot-
land. During the 18th century Scotland had undergone major political changes
that both weakened the country’s autonomy and yet liberalised its intelligentsia
in ways that helped foster that great flourishing of intellectual talent we now call
the Scottish Enlightenment. This intellectual movement laid the groundwork for
so many succeeding cultural and material changes across the world. A number
of its leading lights were members of the University of Glasgow. It was here, in
1Sir Willam Hamilton, Works of Sir William Hamilton, with an introduction by Savina
Tropea, 7 vols (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), vol. 1, Discussions. All references to Hamilton’s
articles are to this reprint edition and in this form. Page numbers correspond to, Discussions on
Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform, 2nd edn (London: Brown, Green
and Longmans; Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1853).
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one of the homes in the Professors’ Court of this University that William Stirling
Hamilton was born on 8 March 1788.
The cultural antecedents within Hamilton’s family background are interesting.
In the late 17th century, two ancestors were leading Covenanters; in the 18th,
several became somewhat distinguished academics. One of Hamilton’s namesakes
became the Professor of Divinity and later Principal of the University of Edin-
burgh — intriguingly he ‘acquired a high reputation [. . . ] for theological erudi-
tion’ (Veitch, p. 5).2 But it was in medicine that Hamilton’s direct male ancestors
excelled. His grandfather, Thomas Hamilton, a professor of medicine at the Uni-
versity of Glasgow, was fairly close to some of the more eminent medics at the
University, such as William Cullen, Joseph Black, and William and John Hunter.
However, Thomas was also frequently in the company of Adam Smith and James
Watt, since not only were they connected through their respective roles within the
University, but they were also members of the literary Anderston Club, presided
over by the classical scholar and, to some extent still renowned, Professor of Math-
ematics, Robert Simson. Hamilton’s father followed in his own father’s academic
footsteps but, having been Professor of Anatomy from his early 20s, he died young,
aged just 31.
William Hamilton’s academic lineage, the mainly Glasgow-based Enlightenment
figures of his father’s and grandfather’s acquaintance, and the general educational
ethos contributed to by a good number of the University’s alumni and profes-
sors during the century of Hamilton’s birth, probably played important roles in
helping to mould the academic he would later become. Certainly it does seem
as though Hamilton looked back into his past and may have found there sources
of inspiration with regard to his somewhat pugilistic critical approach to philoso-
phy, his legendarily extensive erudition, distinctive and in many ways exemplary
pedagogical style, understanding of the nature of philosophy, and (in the works
of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart) subject matter of extensive later study.
Particularly with regard to Reid (who was the Professor of Moral Philosophy at
Glasgow and is generally recognised as the founding father of the Common-Sense
school), Hamilton’s own development of Reidian philosophy is a significant factor
that I shall briefly return to later. However, although Hamilton’s intellectual in-
heritance from mainly Glasgow-based Enlightenment scholars must have helped
shape his intellect, the educative role of his mother, Elizabeth Hamilton, should
not be forgotten.
Hamilton was just 2 years old when his father died. His mother played a crucial
role in his educational development. Elizabeth probably imbued in him a great
keenness to excel, while balancing against this her various attempts to ensure that
he did not develop too fast by, for example, returning him to school education in
England following a period at Glasgow University and affording him ample leisure
time during vacations to enjoy various physical pursuits and the companionship
of other boys and his younger brother Thomas (who later gained some fame as
a writer and the author of the novelistic account of pre-industrial Glasgow, Cyril
2John Veitch, Memoir of Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1869).
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Thornton).3 Hamilton’s early childhood and overall educational experiences under
the supervision of a strong mother were therefore, as it were, the complete obverse
of the deeply unpleasant regime so notoriously inflicted by James Mill and Jeremy
Bentham on John Stuart Mill, the man who would later become Hamilton’s great-
est antagonist (notably some nine years after his death). Mill’s one-time famous
attack on Hamilton in his longest philosophical work, the Examination of the Phi-
losophy of Sir William Hamilton, still stands far in excess of virtually any other
attempt to disparage his standing as a philosopher.4 Since Mill, most commenta-
tors who in one way or another berate Hamilton, either merely add minor footnotes
to Mill’s Examination or uncritically accept his authority. Since Mill’s Examina-
tion — peppered with numerous misreadings of Hamilton — is in so many ways
misleading, it deserves a thorough critical reassessment which I have not judged
to be appropriate or even possible within the scope of this chapter.5
Hamilton’s principal biographer, John Veitch, claims that ‘no son could cherish
greater regard or a more loyal affection for a mother than he did’ (Veitch, p. 12).
However, Hamilton’s early letters to his mother often suggest a surprisingly direct
and at times high-handed manner towards her (see Veitch, pp. 25-6). Fiery, im-
perious, peremptory, Hamilton’s style of writing in these letters possibly indicates
a certain fierceness of temperament tolerated or even enjoyed by his mother. Sev-
eral of his somewhat more mature letters suggest increasing tenderness towards
her (see letter to his mother, dated 27 November 1807, Veitch, p. 31). By the time
of her death in 1827, which profoundly affected him, Hamilton had lived with her
for almost his whole life and there can be little doubt that he was deeply attached
to her (Veitch, pp. 134-5). Veitch claims that Hamilton wrote to his mother ‘with
the familiarity of an equal in point of years, without reserve, and often strongly’
but he credits her with having been conscious of ‘those qualities of mind which
became afterwards so remarkable’ and he accords to Elizabeth the praise of re-
solving ‘to give him every advantage of education which lay in her power’ (Veitch,
p. 27).
Hamilton’s early school education was mainly at the Glasgow Grammar School,
followed by a brief spell in the Latin and Greek classes at the University of Glasgow
in 1800. He was at this time just twelve years old. Though it was not uncommon
for boys to attend Scottish universities at such a young age, Hamilton was certainly
3Thomas Hamilton, The Youth and Manhood of Cyril Thornton, ed. by Maurice Lindsay
(Aberdeen: The Association for Scottish Literary Studies, 1990).
4John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of the Prin-
cipal Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings (London: Longman, Green, Longman,
Roberts & Green, 1865).
5For one attempt to reconcile the logics of Mill and Hamilton prior to Mill’s Examination, see,
[H.L. Mansel], ‘Province of logic and Recent British Logicians’, North British Review, 33 (Nov.
1860), 401-427. There were also several attempts to defend Hamilton following Mill’s attack
— for example, see, [H.L. Mansel], ‘Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy’,
North British Review, 43 (Sept 1865), 1-58. For a brave attempt to defend Hamilton against
Mill, though not specifically addressing his logic, see Dallas Victor Lie Ouren, ‘HaMILLton: Mill
on Hamilton: A Re-examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy’ (unpublished doctoral
thesis, University of Minesota, 1973).
98 Ralph Jessop
on the younger side of the norm. But Elizabeth Hamilton decided against William
continuing his studies at Glasgow in the following academic session and he and
Thomas were therefore moved in 1801 to schools in England. After returning to
Scotland both boys entered the University of Glasgow in 1803, where William
seems to have performed well in Latin, though ‘In the classes of Logic and Moral
Philosophy Hamilton was greatly distinguished, having in each carried off the
highest honour of the year, which was then [. . . ] awarded by the votes of the
members of the class’ (Veitch, p. 21).
Hamilton’s most notable teacher from this time was Professor George Jardine
(1742-1827) in the Logic class. Jardine’s teaching made a lasting impression on
him (Veitch, p. 21). As his studies continued, he studied medicine from 1804,
studying botany and anatomy from 1805. His medical studies continued at Glas-
gow throughout 1806 and, during the winter of 1806-7, at Edinburgh. However, his
book purchases from around this time included a fairly broad array of philosoph-
ical, medical, and historical works (see Veitch, p. 24). Though greatly impressive
by today’s academic standards for undergraduates, the breadth of his reading was
very much in line with the generalist nature of Scottish educational practice and
was not particularly atypical of other students who would later become eminent
scholars and writers. By the time of Hamilton’s death he had amassed some ten
thousand volumes, around eight thousand of which were purchased by the Univer-
sity of Glasgow where they are currently held in a special collection. Within this
collection there are about one hundred and forty editions of Aristotle’s works, and
a good number of the works he reviewed, some of which display neat manuscript
marginalia at times evincing a peculiar degree of care in, for example, comparing
earlier and later editions of works by Archbishop Richard Whately — one of the
Oxford logicians whom Hamilton repeatedly criticised.
If by this time Hamilton was beginning to distinguish himself as a student of
marked ability at the University of Glasgow, probably the most conspicuous edu-
cational advantage Elizabeth bestowed upon her son, was her determination that
he should complete his university education at Oxford. In 1807 he secured a Snell
Exhibition and entered Balliol College where he continued his studies until taking
his Bachelor of Arts in 1810 — he of course obtained a First. His Oxford days
seem to have been highly stimulating — certainly he made many acquaintances
during this period and he read voraciously. The vast extent of Hamilton’s learning
seems to have become somewhat legendary from around the time of his final exam-
ination at Oxford. According to one account, ‘He allowed himself to be examined
in more than four times the number of philosophical and didactic books ever wont
to be taken up even for the highest honours [. . . ]. Since that time [. . . ] there has
been no examination in this University which can be compared with his in respect
to philosophy’ (Veitch, 60). However, his first career was not in philosophy but
instead law.
He became a member of the Bar in 1813 and having returned to Edinburgh he
lived with his mother and his cousin, Miss Marshall, whom he later married in 1829.
His wife was a devoted companion and without her hard work as an amanuensis,
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perhaps little of Hamilton’s lectures would have survived. Though as yet we
know too little about her, Lady Hamilton must have been or become through
her marriage to William, one of those many women during the 19th century whose
knowledge of literature and philosophy far excelled the attainments accredited
to them by posterity. Now that Hamilton was an advocate attempting to make a
living at Edinburgh, with rather too few cases to attend to, he began to investigate
his family history, though not as a light hobby but with a real purpose. Family
tradition had it that William was an indirect descendant of Sir Robert Hamilton
of Preston, a staunchly fierce Covenanter who died in 1701, after which time the
baronetcy was not assumed by the heir and from thenceforth had lapsed into a mere
family memory. After three years of research Hamilton finally presented a case to
the Edinburgh Sheriff which proved that he was the heir-male to his Covenanting
ancestor. Henceforth, William Stirling Hamilton became Sir William Hamilton,
Baronet of Preston and Fingalton (Veitch, 69). This may seem a curious moment
in Hamilton’s personal history but no doubt he was motivated by several practical
considerations, not least of which must have had to do with social and career
advancement. From what I can gather from the occasionally sketchy accounts of
his life by Veitch and Monck, Hamilton had sufficient employment as a lawyer
but was only moderately successful: law was ‘but a secondary pursuit for him’
and instead he haunted the Advocates library with the bibliophilic zeal of an
antiquarian (Veitch, p. 75).6
If he was less suited to the law than he might have been, his politics were also
an obstruction to great material success since he was a Whig, the ruling party of
the day Tory. As Veitch assesses Hamilton’s politics, he was ‘a man of progress’
and liberal principles, though little if at all involved in party politics of any kind
(Veitch, 78). Of course he knew and socialised with many of the leading Scots of the
day, Sir Walter Scott, Thomas de Quincey, Francis Jeffrey, J.G. Lockhart, Macvey
Napier, and many others, but he also seems to have had a fair number or European
friends from Russia, France, and Germany. He visited Leipzig in 1817 and again
travelled to Germany in 1820, visiting libraries in Berlin and Dresden. He was
largely instrumental in the Advocates Library’s purchase of an extensive collection
of valuable German works. His interest in German literature and philosophy, which
would later grow to unrivalled proportions among his contemporaries, dates from
around this time.
Also in 1820 Hamilton applied for the Moral Philosophy professorship at Ed-
inburgh University. Although he had strong support for this chair, not least of
all from the elderly Dugald Stewart, John Wilson (better known as the famous
‘Christopher North’ of Blackwood’s Magazine) secured the post due to the Town
Council’s patronage, though he was by no means a suitable candidate. In many
ways this was quite scandalous and seems to have been entirely due to Hamil-
ton’s Whig politics (Veitch, pp. 96-103). Hamilton had to settle for a poorly paid
Professorship of Civil History to which he was appointed in the following year
6W.H.S. Monck, Sir William Hamilton (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington,
1881).
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and he had to wait for a further 15 years before he secured a post in Philosophy.
Finally, in 1836, though with only a small majority over the other candidate, he
was elected to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh.
Veitch gives a fairly thorough account of Hamilton’s appointment and the strong
testimonials that supported him, but the narrowness of his majority and his fail-
ure to secure the earlier appointment of the Moral Philosophy chair indicate that
University appointments in Scotland were handled in an altogether shameful man-
ner — Hamilton was without doubt one of the most philosophically erudite and
talented men in Scotland at that time but party politics, personal preferences,
and unfounded doubts about his religious beliefs were allowed to prevail. In some
ways little had changed since the more understandable yet equally non-academic
rejection of David Hume by the University of Glasgow in the previous century,
nor since the huge debacle that erupted in 1805 when John Leslie was accused of
being an infidel and as a result nearly failed to secure the Mathematics Chair at
Edinburgh in 1805 because he had endorsed Hume’s theory of causality (see Veitch
pp. 183-210).7
Though there is much to relate about Hamilton’s life from this time on, like
many scholars and dedicated teachers he led an industrious and comparatively
uneventful life, though not unmarred by damaging vicissitudes, such as the deaths
of his son in 1836, his brother Thomas in 1842, and a daughter in the winter of
1844-5. From the time of his appointment to the Logic and Metaphysics Chair
in 1836 until around the mid 40s, Hamilton was clearly working far too hard and
under a great deal of personal strain. Then, in July 1844, aged 56, he suffered a
physically debilitating stroke that partially paralysed him for the rest of his life.
Two years later he became embroiled in a controversy with Augustus de Morgan
concerning their respective quantification systems. Academically, this is undoubt-
edly the most troublesome and embarrassing moment in Hamilton’s career and
several have agreed that he have behaved rather foolishly. According to William
Kneale, Hamilton was ‘a pedantic Scottish baronet’ who was ‘properly ridiculed
by De Morgan’.8 General opinion about the affair has been that de Morgan came
out on top. 9 Possibly the intensely desperate times of the mid 40s in Britain gen-
erally, a prevailing sense of crisis in Scotland following the massive upheaval due
to the disruption of the Scottish Kirk in 1843, the various bereavements Hamilton
had suffered, and his loss of physical vigour may be factors that ought to be con-
sidered. Hamilton may have acted in an imperious but also a somewhat desperate
manner towards de Morgan but one cannot help but wonder whether his judgment
merely faltered amidst a context of great personal and social difficulties.
The details of the de Morgan controversy are tediously complex, the complexity
exacerbated by Hamilton’s forensic analyses of the events and his sustained sus-
7On Leslie see, Ralph Jessop, Carlyle and Scottish Thought (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997),
pp. 36-9.
8William Kneale, ‘Boole and the Revival of Logic’, Mind, 57 (Apr. 1948), 149-75 (p. 152n).
9For example, see, William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1962), pp. 353-4.
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picions over some years that de Morgan had plagiarised or at least was in some
way trying to steal all credit from him. This issue lasted for many years well
beyond Hamilton’s death and although Hamilton backed down considerably from
his first accusations of plagiarism in 1847, neither men really gave up. But, as
de Morgan’s fame rather prospered as a result of the conflict, Hamilton’s prestige
diminished. Peter Heath has analysed and recounted this controversy in admirable
detail and therefore I shall defer to his general understanding of the whole affair, if
not to his tendency to agree that de Morgan’s assessment of Hamilton’s quantifi-
cation is right.10 Some, though perhaps not all, of the relevant letters and other
documents were collected together by Hamilton and are published within the re-
cent Thoemmes edition of Hamilton’s Works.11 In very general terms, it would
seem that both de Morgan and Hamilton did not fully understand each other’s
respective positions and arguably ‘the two systems are not only distinct from, but
opposed to each other.’12 As I shall argue later in agreement with Robert Fogelin,
de Morgan was mistaken concerning a fundamental point and Hamilton’s system
can thus be shown to be consistent and much more robust than many who sub-
scribed to de Morgan’s standpoint have assumed it to be. One of the most fruitful
and important outcomes of the controversy was the effect it had on George Boole
whose interest in logic and subsequent mathematization of logic was in no small
part inspired by the rather public disagreement between de Morgan and Hamil-
ton.13 Heath insightfully remarks of the de Morgan controversy, de Morgan’s notes
‘contain the following, which might well serve (and was perhaps so intended) as
an epigraph for the whole encounter: “Two French squadrons at B — cannonaded
each other — why? Because each took the other for Russians. ‘Then why did
they fight?’ Said a little girl’.14
Although Hamilton was not affected mentally by the stroke he suffered in 1844
and managed to continue in his Chair at Edinburgh for a good many years after,
it is fair to say that he was greatly impeded by this disablement. Indeed, it is
arguable that his standing as a philosopher may have suffered more from this
than from Mill’s Examination, since one of the greatest problems in studying
Hamilton’s works has always been simply this: he produced no magnum opus
either in metaphysics or logic. It is reasonable, if yet somewhat whimsical, to say
that, had he not been struck down in 1844 he would have at some stage during
his remaining years brought his philosophical endeavours together in at least one
definitive and fully mature volume. But this did not happen and after his paralysis
he produced relatively little until his death at Edinburgh on 6 May 1856, aged 68.
Although Hamilton did not produce a fully definitive work on metaphysics or on
10Peter Heath, ‘Introduction’ in, Augustus de Morgan, On the Syllogism and Other Logical
Writings (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), vii-xxxi (pp. xii-xx).
11Miscellaneous Writings and Correspondence, Works, vol. 7.
12[H.L. Mansel], ‘Recent Extensions of Formal Logic’, North British Review, 15 (May 1851),
90-121 (p. 95n).
13See, Luis M. Laita, ‘Influences on Boole’s Logic: The Controversy between William Hamilton
and Augustus De Morgan’, Annals of Science, 36 (1979), 45-65 (p. 61; p. 65).
14Heath, p. xvi.
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logic, he nevertheless did write rather extensively, producing material which, in the
recently reprinted edition of his works by Thoemmes Press, fills seven volumes. In
addition to this, he also produced an extraordinarily, many would say excessively
footnoted edition of the Works of Thomas Reid in which he first published his
fragment on Logic the ‘New Analytic of Logical Forms’ in 1846.15 His footnotes
in Reid’s Works are at times quirky and needlessly pedantic. However, by sharp
contrast with this, towards the end of his life he produced a much less cumbersome
and indeed rather elegant edition of the Works of Dugald Stewart.16 However, long
before these scholarly works Hamilton contributed a series of substantial articles for
the Edinburgh Review all of which, despite his failing health he managed to publish
in a single volume entitled Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education
and University Reform in 1852. The first of these essays, the ‘Philosophy of
the Unconditioned’ (1829) immediately struck readers as largely unintelligible or
overly philosophically sophisticated, mystical even in its complexity — but it was
this article that properly launched Hamilton’s career and first made him famous
as the first truly eminent Scottish philosopher since Dugald Stewart who, after
many years of ill health, had died in the previous year.17
In ‘Philosophy of the Unconditioned’ Hamilton reviews the work of Victor
Cousin and his attempt to establish an eclectic philosophy of the Infinito-Absolute.
The main thing to note here is that Hamilton constructed what he termed his Law
of the Conditioned, a law prescribing the domain of positive knowledge or the realm
of what may be said to be knowable — in some ways it might be regarded as a
forerunner of Ayer’s logical positivism, though Hamiltonian positivism is a far cry
from rejecting either metaphysics or theology. A full account of this article is not
appropriate here — suffice to say that Hamilton argues that all knowledge lies in
a mean between two extremes of unknowables or inconditionates, which is to say
all things that may be described as absolute or as infinite comprise the boundaries
of knowledge and are thus strictly incomprehensible to us. The absolute and the
infinite are posited as contradictories, neither of which can be positively construed
to the mind but one of which, on the basis of the laws of excluded middle and
non-contradiction must obtain — though which of the two obtains is incognisable.
Hence, Hamilton inaugurates what I call his doctrine of nescience, or learned ig-
norance as the ‘consummation’ of knowledge (‘Philosophy of the Unconditioned’,
p. 38). As all thought, and hence all knowledge, is conditional, of the plural, phe-
nomenal, limited, Hamilton declares: ‘To think is to condition; and conditional
limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought’ (‘Philosophy of the
Unconditioned’, p. 14).
Educated in philosophical discourses of the much more sedate and even-tempered
15Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, preface, notes, and supplementary dissertations
by Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh: MacLachlan, Stewart; London: Longman, Brown, Green
and Longmans, 1846).
16The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, ed. by Sir William Hamilton, 11 vols (Edinburgh:
Thomas Constable, 1854-60).
17‘Francis Jeffrey to Macvey Napier, 23 November, 1829’, in Macvey Napier [Jnr.], ed., Selec-
tions from the Correspondence of the Late Macvey Napier (London: Harrison, 1877), p. 68.
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stateliness that typified so much earlier 18th century and contemporary philosoph-
ical prose from Francis Hutchison, to Hume, Smith, Reid and Dugald Stewart,
few at the time may have been able to understand what Hamilton wrote. His
highly concentrated style, densely philosophical critical argumentation, frequent
references to various German philosophers including Kant, Fichte, and Hegel —
though all this must have dazzled and excluded many, few can have failed to catch
the sense of excitement that pervaded ‘Philosophy of the Unconditioned’. But
this must have been more the case with his second major article ‘Philosophy of
Perception’ (1830) which was written in an even more vigorous and racy style than
his first. He now turned his attention to scepticism, principally to the scepticism
of Hume, though one could be forgiven for missing this since more prominently
‘Philosophy of Perception’ launches an extraordinarily vitriolic attack on the man
who had gained such a high reputation as a philosopher and who for many years
continued to be admired by established English philosophers and writers such as
John Stuart Mill and Leslie Stephen and whose job, following his death, Hamilton
failed to get in 1820 — Thomas Brown. Hamilton savaged Brown for leading phi-
losophy back into the morass of Humean scepticism and for fundamentally failing
to grasp the true import of Thomas Reid’s critical philosophy of Common Sense,
which, according to Hamilton, had given a successful, if nonetheless relatively
unsophisticated answer to Hume.
So much needs to be said about this article but I shall confine myself to just a
few points: in ‘Philosophy of Perception’ Hamilton developed his own version of
Common Sense philosophy in the form of a doctrine of perception which held that
in the act of perception the self and the not-self were instantaneously revealed in
one indivisible moment of cognition — he called this theory of perception natural
dualism or natural realism and maintained that, contradistinguished from all other
representationist theories of perception that in one way or another tended towards
scepticism, natural dualism was a theory of immediate or presentative perception.
Leaving aside all consideration of just how natural dualism was proffered by Hamil-
ton as the best and most successful counter-argument to what some may think
of as a straw man scepticism of purely theoretic indeterminacy — the absolute
scepticism of Hume — I want to draw attention to Hamilton’s non-Kantian notion
of the relativity of knowledge by means of just one quotation:18
Relatives are known only together: the science of opposites is one.
Subject and object, mind and matter, are known only in correlation
and contrast [. . . ]. Every conception of self, necessarily involves a
conception of not-self: every perception of what is different from me,
18Hamilton has often been mistakenly thought of as borrowing heavily from Kant. However,
in several places he is critical of Kant and his relativity of knowledge needs to be distinguished
from Kant’s. On this see, Manfred Kuehn, ‘Hamilton’s Reading of Kant: A Chapter in the
Early Scottish Reception of Kant’s Thought’, in George MacDonald Ross and Tony McWalter,
Kant and His Influence (Bristol: Thoemmes Antiquarian Books, 1990), 315–347 (pp. 333–45).
It should perhaps also be noted that Hamilton’s notion of the relativity of knowledge is more
subtle and more complex than Mill represents it as being. On this see, John Veitch, Hamilton
(Edinburgh And London: Blackwood, 1882), pp. 201–222.
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implies a recognition of the percipient subject in contradistinction from
the object perceived. [. . . ]. In Perception, as in the other faculties, the
same indivisible consciousness is conversant about both terms of the
relation of knowledge. (‘Philosophy of Perception’, pp. 50–51).
Although the details of Hamilton’s theory of the relativity of knowledge deserve
separate examination, in the above we can see indications of a notion that is of
critical importance to understanding Hamilton’s logic, namely, the notion that
subject and object exist only in correlation with one another, such that opposites,
or the distinguishable terms of subject and predicate in a given proposition, may
be thought of as being held together in a relationship of equation or non-equation
— in this lies the germ of Hamilton’s emphasis on the relativity of concepts and
his quantification of the predicate.
The influence that Hamilton’s two articles on the unconditioned and percep-
tion had on Victorian thought is a subject that deserves separate study. Noah
Porter, professor of moral philosophy and metaphysics (1846), and later president
of Yale, wrote effusively and at some length in Veitch’s biography of the consid-
erable extent of Hamilton’s influence on American students (Veitch, pp. 421-8).
However, although Porter thought that Hamilton had been a positive religious
force in American thought, there is another side to this story. Emphasising the
vastness of our ignorance in ‘Philosophy of the Unconditioned’, while regarding
this as a prompt for our wonderment and faith, the most significant direct and
lasting effect of the ‘Philosophy of the Unconditioned’ is perhaps best assessed
in terms of the influence it had upon Henry L. Mansel, a prominent follower of
Hamilton who wrote several articles defending Hamilton’s logic, developed his own
version it, and, more popularly, in his Bampton Lectures, gave rise to a doctrine
of Christian Agnosticism.19 But as the agnostic movement developed during the
19th century, Hamilton’s ‘Philosophy of the Unconditioned’ in comparison with
its transmutation into Mansel’s Christian Agnosticism can also be seen as having
a profound effect on anti-Christian agnostics such as Thomas Huxley (Darwin’s
bulldog). As Sheridan Gilley and Ann Loades nicely put it: ‘Huxley saw in Mansel
the suicidally honest theologian, sitting on an inn sign and sawing it off.’20 Hamil-
ton’s importance to the growth of agnosticism, although not widely known, has
certainly been established not only by more recent scholarship but also in some of
the responses to Hamilton in his own day.21 Hence, though firstly, inspiring a new
religious piety and apparent salvation from scepticism, but secondly, becoming in-
fused into succeeding waves of religious doubt and the growth of agnostic principles
19For example, see Henry Longueville Mansel, Prolegomena Logica: An Enquiry into the Psy-
chological Character of Logical Processes (Oxford, 1851); ‘The Philosophy of the Conditioned:
Sir William Hamilton and John Stuart Mill’, Contemporary Review, 1 (1866), 31-49; 185-219;
[Bampton Lectures], The Limits of Religious Thought (London : John Murray, 1858).
20Sheridan Gilley and Ann Loades, ‘Thomas Henry Huxley: The War between Science and
Religion’, The Journal of Religion, 61 (1981), 285-308 (p. 297).
21Bernard Lightman, The Origins of Agnosticism: Victorian Unbelief and the Limits of
Knowledge (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 16; Robert Flint,
Agnosticism (Edinburgh and London: Wm Blackwood, 1903).
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more powerfully damaging to orthodox belief than even Hume’s or Voltaire’s more
full-frontal atheistic attacks on religious belief, the full significance that Hamil-
ton’s ‘Philosophy of the Unconditioned’ would come to have on Victorian society,
philosophy, literature, and culture, though as yet still largely unrecognised, was
nothing short of immense.22
But Hamilton’s influence can also be seen through certain of his friends or ac-
quaintances and, of course, his students. One of his former students who was
profoundly influenced by him and became the Professor of Moral Philosophy at
the University of St. Andrews, James Frederick Ferrier, a philosopher whose per-
sonal and philosophical connections with Hamilton run deep and whose work is
now just as undeservedly but even less well known than that of Hamilton. In
literature Hamilton was a major influence on E. S. Dallas whose two volume work
of literary theory, The Gay Science, positively teems with Hamiltonian philosophy
— but Dallas has also now shrunk into the shadows and is barely known.23 George
Davie claims that Hamilton inspired a number of brilliant scholars including Fer-
rier and the physicist so greatly admired by Einstein, James Clerk Maxwell.24
The Maxwell connection is particularly interesting since a recent work of literary
criticism has opened up a whole new field of study — the Victorian relativity
movement. Christopher Herbert argues in Victorian Relativity that the cultural
and philosophical antecedents of Einstein’s special theory of relativity are to be
found in a succession of Victorian philosophers and thinkers the writings of whom
have often been largely neglected for over a century. Interestingly, just as scholars
who have written on agnosticism have traced its origins in the 19th century back
to Hamilton, Herbert also finds in Hamilton’s theory of the relativity of knowledge
a significant starting point for his study, seeing Hamilton at the beginning of a
major Victorian re-invention of the fundamentally Protagorean relativist rejection
of absolutism.25 First suggested in ‘Philosophy of the Unconditioned’, developed
in ‘Philosophy of Perception’, and, as we shall see, a key component of Hamil-
ton’s logic, Hamiltonian relativism intriguingly re-positions Hamilton as one of
the 19th-century’s key avante garde thinkers.
It is too easy to see Hamilton in caricature and as of marginal importance, since
this is where the later Victorians placed him and where scholars of the 20th century
left him. However, for all that he was hampered by a corrupt system of university
patronage and indeed may not have been the most self-promoting of figures, within
the context of British philosophy and literature of the 1830s, Hamilton was a
22See, Ralph Jessop, ‘Carlyle’s Agnosticism: An Altar to the Unknown and Unknowable God’,
Literature and Belief, 25 (1&2), 381-433 (pp. 395-404).
23E.S. Dallas, The Gay Science (London: Chapman and Hall, 1866).
24See, George Elder Davie, The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and Her Universities in the
Nineteenth Century, Edinburgh University Publications, History Philosophy & Economics: 12
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1961; repr. 1982), p. 261; John Hendry, James Clerk
Maxwell and the Theory of the Electromagnetic Field (Bristol and Boston: Adam Hilger, 1986),
p. 112.
25Christopher Herbert, Victorian Relativity: Radical thought and Scientific Discovery
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 35-7.
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leading and highly dynamic writer who played an important part in re-invigorating
Reidian philosophy while also turning British attention arguably in a different
but by no means unrelated direction towards German philosophy. It must be
noted that in early 19th-century Britain very few people could read German and
Hamilton seems to have been one of almost a handful of intellectuals in Britain
during the 1820s and 30s who had any direct knowledge of the works of Kant and
other German philosophers such as Hegel. Hamilton was one of a tiny number
of Germanizers who promoted the study of German philosophy and, given the
rise of neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian philosophy in Britain amongst philosophers
who owed some debt to Hamilton, in this alone his influence was probably much
more profound than has generally been appreciated. Another major Germanizer
was Hamilton’s one-time friend, the literary man of letters, Thomas Carlyle, who
knew Hamilton from at least the late 1820s. Carlyle, though a literary giant of
the Victorian period and even well beyond of proportions it would be difficult to
exaggerate, is yet another figure who is now increasingly little known and poorly
understood. Not much is positively known about their friendship but at the time of
its publication in 1829 Carlyle read Hamilton’s ‘Philosophy of the Unconditioned’
with admiration in later life he wrote a highly reverent Reminiscence of Hamilton
which is published in Veitch’s biography, followed by a fairly intimate letter from
Carlyle written in 1834 in which he says, ‘Think kindly of me; there are few in
Scotland I wish it more from’ (Veitch, pp. 121-127). There are undoubtedly many
interesting parallels between Carlyle and Hamilton, some of which were detected in
Carlyle’s own lifetime by his close friend David Masson.26 I and some others have
discussed some of the interconnections between Carlyle and Hamilton elsewhere.27
Hamilton produced a good number of other articles for the Edinburgh Review,
including the following selection: ‘On the Revolutions of Medicine in Reference
to Cullen’ (1832); ‘On the Study of Mathematics as an Exercise of the Mind’
(1836) — controversially, though rather in keeping with his Scottish predecessors
attitudes about mathematics, Hamilton did not think that mathematics was a good
exercise of the mind as part of a liberal education and instead advocated philosophy
while in several ways indicting the emphasis on mathematics at Cambridge; ‘On
the Patronage and Superintendence of Universities’ (1834);28 ‘On the State of the
English Universities with More Especial Reference to Oxford’ (1831). Several of his
articles were pointedly critical of Oxford and Cambridge and it must be said that
Hamilton undoubtedly set himself up for retributive attacks from some scholars
in response to his various denunciations of the established ancient universities of
England. More directly germane to our subject matter and also involving his
26David Masson, Recent British Philosophy: A Review with Criticisms including some Com-
ments on Mr Mill’s Answer to Sir William Hamilton, 3rd edn (London: Macmillan, 1877),p.
69.
27For example see, Alex Benchimol, ‘William Hamilton’ in, The Carlyle Encyclopedia, edited
by Mark Cumming (Cranbury, NJ:Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2004), 207-9; Jessop,
Carlyle and Scottish Thought, pp. 28-31.
28For example compare, Richard Olson, ‘Scottish Philosophy and Mathematics 1750-1830’,
Journal of the History of Ideas, 32 (1971), 29-44 (pp. 41-4).
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first of many salvos against English logicians, is his ‘Logic: The Recent English
Treatises on that Science’ (1833).
In this article he gave yet another virtuoso performance that at once established
his reputation as one of the foremost logicians of his day. But, as with some of
his other slashing remarks on contemporary scholars and, as he saw it, the present
philistinism of learning in Britain, in ‘Logic’ he was unsparing in his treatment of
several Oxonian logicians. Supposedly reviewing some eight recent publications on
logic, he focuses almost exclusively on Whately’s Elements of Logic, making only
brief reference to George Bentham’s Outline of a New System of Logic (1827). As
some commentators have noted, the cursory treatment of Bentham is odd since a
system for quantifying the predicate is given in the work of this nephew of the more
famous Jeremy Bentham.29 Hamilton’s paternity of this doctrine has often been
called in doubt but since most of the specific characteristics of his quantification
are largely, if not exclusively, peculiar to him, and since his own theory is so
thoroughly grounded in a painstaking explication of the grounds for quantifying
the predicate, I shall not engage with the tortuous historical complexities and shall
instead attempt in the following sections to outline how Hamilton arrives at his
quantification system and what that system itself is. Furthermore, it is likely that
Hamilton was so dismissive of Bentham’s Outline that he simply did not read all
of the text and cast it aside in order that he might focus on the main logician, his
principal target, Richard Whately.
Though Hamilton intimates a certain degree of respect for the natural abilities
of the authors under review, he denounces their lack of genuine originality — the
source of Hamilton’s ire is clear and is a much repeated complaint elsewhere in his
work, namely, the inadequacy of the authors’ learning:
None of them possess — not to say a superfluous erudition on their
subject — even the necessary complement of information. Not one
seems to have studied the logical treatises of Aristotle; all are ignorant
of the Greek Commentators on the Organon, of the Scholastic, Ramist,
Cartesian, Wolfian, and Kantian dialectic. (‘Logic’, p. 129).
And so he continues to cut and hew his way through the inadequate learning of
contemporary Oxonians. But, as Whately’s Elements stood pre-eminent, it is this
work that Hamilton takes to task and he proceeds to make point after forensic point
against Whately, all the time demonstrating his own vastly superior knowledge of
swathes of the literature of logic and outlining several features of his own system
of logic.
As part of his sustained attempt to claim priority in discovering his system of
quantification, in a much later footnote in Discussions Hamilton asserts that on
the basis of a rather vague authority — ‘the tenor of the text’– the ‘Logic’ article
shows that he ‘had become aware of the error in the doctrine of Aristotle and the
logicians, which maintains that the predicate in affirmative propositions could only
be formally quantified as particular’ (‘Logic’, p. 162n). More strongly, and with
29Heath, p. xvi.
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much better justification, he writes in an appendix in Discussions, ‘Touching the
principle of an explicitly Quantified Predicate, I had by 1833 become convinced
of the necessity to extend and correct the logical doctrine upon this point. In
the article on Logic [. . . ] the theory of Induction there maintained proceeds on
a thoroughgoing quantification of the predicate, in affirmative propositions’ (Dis-
cussions, p. 650). Certainly the 1833 ‘Logic’ article does suggest this but it does
not display the full quantification system (see ‘Logic’, p. 163). As I shall indicate
later, although the quantification system was not fully articulated until the publi-
cation of his ‘New Analytic’ in 1846, a good deal of Hamilton’s treatment of logic
in his lectures does proceed, painstakingly towards the quantification. That he
was teaching this system during the late 1830s, several years ahead of de Morgan’s
quite different quantification, seems to have been generally agreed and is patently
evident in the wonderfully clear account given by one of his students, Thomas
Spencer Baynes, whose winning essay written for a competition set by Hamilton
in 1846 was later published as An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms in
1850.30
In ‘Logic’ Hamilton very much lays out his stall. He begins with a brief definition
of logic that he later elaborates:
Nothing, we think, affords a more decisive proof of the oblique and
partial spirit in which philosophy has been cultivated in Britain, for
the last century and a half, than the combined perversion and neglect,
which Logic — the science of the formal laws of thought — has expe-
rienced during that period. (‘Logic’, p. 119).
Just a few years after writing this, Hamilton commenced his Lectures on Logic as
the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh. These were posthumously
published in four volumes, two on Metaphysics in 1859 and two on Logic in 1860.
In the Lectures on Logic, Hamilton spends a lot more time carefully explaining his
above definition of logic as ‘the science of the formal laws of thought’. Though
his definition of logic in the lectures is interesting and deserves discussion, I shall
merely summarise some main points here.
Hamilton basically holds that Logic proper or Formal Logic is Abstract logic,
dealing only with necessary inference and devoid of all adventitious or extra-logical
matter or contingent considerations. However, the nature of Logic as a pure sci-
ence had been greatly misunderstood in Britain: ‘Bacon wholly misconceived its
character in certain respects; but his errors are insignificant, when compared with
the total misapprehension of its nature by Locke’ (LL.I.29).31 The British had
mistakenly departed from a certain general agreement on the formal nature of
30Thomas Spencer Baynes, An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms, Being that which
Gained the Prize Proposed by Sir William Hamilton, in the Year 1846, for the Best Exposition
of the New Doctrine Propounded in his Lectures; with an Historical Appendix (Edinburgh:
Sutherland and Knox; London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co., 1850).
31All references in this form are to the Lectures on Logic, ed. by H.L. Mansel and John Veitch
(Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1860), vols I or II; vols 5 or 6 in the Thoemmes reprint
edition of Hamilton’s Works.
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Logic among ancient and more recent German logicians. They had ignorantly
or perversely deviated from centuries of collective wisdom and while German lo-
gicians from the time of Leibniz had probably done more than most to further
the science, Hamilton seems to have regarded the more recent and more serious
perversions and confusions in the work of recent English authors, in particular
Whately, as a sort of further entrenchment of the very kind of misconstrual most
likely to hinder the science (LL.I.40). It was also reprehensible that such recent
British scholars should be ignorant of the German logicians: ‘Great Britain is,
I believe, the only country of Europe in which books are written by respectable
authors upon sciences, of the progress of which, for above a century, they have
never taken the trouble to inform themselves’ (LL.I.33).
Distinguishing between Special or Concrete Logic (logic in its particular ap-
plications or instantiations in the several arts and sciences) and Pure or General
or Abstract Logic, for Hamilton, Pure Logic has to be contradistinguished from
any particular subject or discipline, the object-matter of which must necessarily
be contingent due to the nature of the topics it addresses or to which Logic is
being in some sense applied or put into practice (LL.I.56). However, while Spe-
cial Logic is dismissed this is not to say that practical matters to do with Logic
must be altogether excluded from consideration (see LL.I.61-2). He coins the term
‘Modified Logic’ to describe what he argues had been improperly called Applied
Logic by Kant and some other German philosophers, defining Modified Logic as
‘a science, which considers thought not merely as determined by its necessary
and universal laws, but as contingently affected by the empirical conditions under
which thought is actually exerted’ (LL.I.60). Although Hamilton’s treatment of
Modified Logic in the second volume of his Lectures on Logic as the correlative
second main branch of Abstract Logic, is certainly interesting, I have chosen not
to discuss it but instead focus on what for Hamilton was clearly of much greater
immediate importance, namely, Formal or Pure Logic. He insists that Pure Logic
really comprises the whole of Abstract Logic — Modified Logic is ‘a mere mix-
ture of Logic and Psychology’; ‘There is in truth only one Logic, that is, Pure
or Abstract Logic’, ‘Modified Logic being only a scientific accident, ambiguously
belonging either to Logic or to Psychology’ (LL.I.63).
With such points in mind, he provisionally defines Logic as ‘the Science of the
Laws of Thought as Thought’ (LL.I.4). Extruding the contingent, inasmuch as
this is possible, Hamilton claims that Logic is only concerned with those phenom-
ena of formal (or subjective) thought that are necessary or ‘such as cannot but
appear’ as opposed to the contingent phenomena of thought, or ‘such as may or
may not appear’ (LL.I.24). Hence, through his final introduction of the notion
of necessary laws being the sole province of Logic, Hamilton asserts that ‘Logic,
therefore, is at last fully and finally defined as the science of the necessary forms
of thought’ (LL.I.24). Though this is Hamilton’s final definition of Logic, he takes
care to explain the sense or ‘quality’ of ‘necessary’ by extensively quoting Wilhelm
Esser’s System der Logik.32 Hence, to summarize Esser’s arguments as translated
32Hamilton translates for his students many passages from Esser. His inclusion of these nu-
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by Hamilton: the necessity of a form of thought is contradistinguished from con-
tingency by being subjective, which is to say that a necessary form of thought
‘must be determined or necessitated by the nature of the thinking subject itself’
as opposed to being determined objectively; since we are incapable of conceiving
the possibility of its non-existence, such incapacity warrants the notion that the
form of thought in question is original to, or a constitutive feature of, the thinking
subject or human mind, and thus the subjective necessity of a form of thought
‘must be original and not acquired’; as necessary, subjective, and original in the
sense explained, the form of thought that comprises the object-matter of Logic
cannot necessitate on some occasions and not on others, and thus it must also be
universal ; and finally, further enriching the sense or quality of ‘necessity’, accord-
ing to Esser, ‘if a form of thought be necessary and universal, it must be a law;
for a law is that which applies to all cases without exception, and from which a
deviation is ever, and everywhere, impossible, or, at least, unallowed’ (LL.I.24-5).
With the sense of ‘necessity’ within the phrase ‘necessary forms of thought’ hereby
explained in terms of something subjectively determined by the human mind as
subject and not objectively determined or extraneous to the mind, original and
not acquired, universal, and a law, Hamilton gives what he regards as his ‘most
explicit enunciation of the object-matter of Logic’ as: ‘Logic is the science of the
Laws of Thought as Thought, or the science of the Formal Laws of Thought, or
the science of the Laws of the Form of thought; for all these are merely various
expressions of the same thing.’ (LL.I.25-6).
Many more recent formal logicians would generally agree that formal Logic,
as contradistinguished from informal Logic and the subject matter or topics of
Rhetoric, is entirely or principally concerned with deductive arguments and thus
with valid inference and the necessary laws that pertain to or determine valid-
ity. But we need to take notice of the state of logic in 1830s Britain as Hamilton
understood it: his contemporaries appeared to him to be woefully misguided, un-
scholarly in their reading of the Aristotlean tradition, and blissfully ignorant of the
more recent German tradition in logic since the time of Leibniz. Hamilton’s peers
were, as far as he could tell, largely unaware of how the recent German writers in-
cluding and after Kant had far excelled the Oxford logicians in their knowledge and
understanding of the subject. Furthermore, it seems clear that part of Hamilton’s
crusade was against the prevailing tendency of philosophy in Britain towards the
increasingly prevalent mediocrity and barbarity of his times that almost inevitably
was following in the wake of and was implicitly collusive with an era of rapidly
advancing materialism. Pervaded from its outset by reason and scepticism, during
the early decades of the 19th century the Enlightenment was evolving into new
forms of a more socially pervasive utilitarian rationality and sceptical subversions
of reason and faith. Acutely conscious of such trends in philosophical discourse
Hamilton took considerable pains to establish his standpoint as one much more
closely in line with the German approach that regarded Logic as a pure science.
merous quotations implies the commencement of a substantial realignment in British philosophy
with German logicians.
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2 DOCTRINE OF CONCEPTS
Logic [. . . ] is exclusively conversant about thought,–about thought
considered strictly as the operation of Comparison or the faculty of
Relations; and thought, in this restricted signification, is the cognition
of any mental object by another in which it is considered as included,–
in other words, thought is the knowledge of things under conceptions.
(LL.I.40).
Shortly after the above quotation Hamilton distinguishes between the act of con-
ceiving (conception) and the thing conceived (concept) and briefly suggests a sim-
ilar distinction with regard to perception, somewhat tentatively coining the term
‘percept’ some 40 years before its first recorded use in the Oxford English Dictio-
nary. He takes particular care to point out that Logic is concerned with ‘thought
considered as a product; that is, as a concept, a judgment, a reasoning’ (LL.I.74).
The operation of Comparison, or as he later calls it, the Faculty of Comparison,
produces Concepts, Judgments, and Reasonings. However, Hamilton argues that
Concepts and Reasonings are modifications of Judgments, ‘for the act of judging,
that is, the act of affirming or denying one thing of another in thought, is that
in which the Understanding or Faculty of Comparison is essentially expressed’
(LL.I.117). This means that for Hamilton, ‘A concept is a judgment’ and as such
it collects together or is ‘the result of a foregone judgment, or series of judgments,
fixed and recorded in a word,–a sign’ which may be supplemented or extended by
additional attributes, themselves judgments (LL.I.117). Thus, as a concept in a
sense fixes a judgment or series of judgments, collecting together various attributes
within a single term, so also can it be analysed into these components or amplified
by the annexation of further attributes.
An important point to note here that will later be of fundamental significance to
Hamilton’s quantification of the predicate, is that for Hamilton an oft-ignored and
oft-violated postulate or principle of Logic is that the import of the terms used in
a judgment or reasoning should be fully understood or made explicit, which is to
say that ‘Logic postulates to be allowed to state explicitly in language all that is
implicitly contained in thought’, that Logic demands licence to make explicit the
full import of any particular concept or term, much as it attempts to do in making
overt all of the steps and relations involved in a given process of reasoning or ar-
gument. Though this fundamental postulate is simple in its statement, Hamilton
clearly regarded its significance as central to his project to evolve or develop Logic
as a Pure science: ‘This postulate [. . . ], though a fundamental condition of Logic,
has not been consistently acted on by logicians in their development of the science;
and from this omission have arisen much confusion and deficiency and error in our
present system of Logic’ (LL.I.114). Interestingly, in one place he makes the postu-
late more precise by replacing the term ‘implicit’ with ‘efficient’ (NA.LL.II.270).33
33All references in this form are as above to the Lectures on Logic with ‘NA’ prefixed to indicate
the ‘New Analytic of Logical Forms’ as given in vol.II.249-317.
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The analysis of concepts into their often implicitly-held component attributes as
also their amplification by means of adding new attributes, effectually constitutes
an adherence to this postulate. Indeed, arguably, Hamilton’s emphasis on the im-
portance of being rigorously explicit elevates this postulate to the status of what
one might call a meta-theoretical principle of explicitness.
With reference to the Latin ‘concipere’ he explains that traditionally concep-
tion indicated ‘the process of embracing or comprehending the many into the one’,
‘the act of comprehending or grasping up into unity the various qualities by which
an object is characterised’ (LL.I.120). Within our consciousness this process is
typified by two cognitions, one immediate and ‘only of the individual or singular’,
the other ‘a knowledge of the common, general, or universal’ (LL.I.122). Thus ‘a
Concept is the cognition or idea of the general character or characters, point or
points, in which a plurality of objects coincide’ (LL.I.122, and see, 122-3). Mir-
roring his notion of the formation of language, which he outlines in his Lectures
on Metaphysics,34 as a synthesising process that moves from chaos to the con-
struction of general and universal terms which enable a complex and iterative
relationship with the individuals or particulars into which such concepts may be
analysed — a process of composition and decomposition that he occasionally de-
scribes as organic — Hamilton regards the formation of concepts as a complex
process involving human agency or the exertion of an ‘act of Comparison’ upon
an otherwise chaotic or confused array of presentations. Reminiscent of his highly
significant relativist maxim, ‘To think is to condition’, Hamilton is thus acutely
aware of the role of human agency or volition in the process or mental activity
involved in the formation of concepts as unities consisting of various points drawn
together by an act of comparison and the implicit intentionality within this action
‘of discovering their similarities and differences’ (LL.I.123). This awareness of the
part played by human agency or volition, and the artificiality and partiality of
concepts, becomes clearer when he invokes ‘the act called Attention’, by means
of which certain objects and qualities forming any given concept become strongly
highlighted (LL.I.123). As Hamilton explains the mental operations of attention
and abstraction, these two processes involved in the formation of concepts ‘are,
as it were, the positive and negative poles of the same act’, by means of which as
some objects and qualities become highlighted, others ‘are thrown into obscurity’
(LL.I.124, 123). He is claiming that the thinking subject’s point of view or per-
spective, or conditioning role is crucial to the formation of concepts, and as we
shall see later, point of view also plays an important role with regard to Hamilton’s
treatment of propositions.
What Hamilton is describing here, and in what follows this observation about
the act of abstraction and attention, is the relativity of concepts, and thereby he
begins to point up certain implicit features of concepts that emphasise their fluidity
or their adaptability, as well as their inherent inadequacy or insufficiently explicit
nature. For Hamilton the act of comparison combined with that of abstraction
and attention reduces in consciousness the multiple (or really differing objects of
34Lectures on Metaphysics, II.327-332.
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consciousness) into the unity that is a concept (see LL.I.124). By throwing out of
view the non-resembling marks or characters or points that in reality individuate
one individual from another, and by attending to the resembling points alone, we
treat these resembling points as though they were identical and thereby synthesise
them into a unity, a concept through which we think of the individuals or to which
we relate these individuals. Implicitly, in opposition to mechanistically grounded
(or mechanically modelled) theories of the mind, for Hamilton the formation of
concepts in the mental act of conception is a single or indivisible, quasi-organic
process of thought that may be analysed into components for the purpose of speak-
ing about and better comprehending concepts (see LL.I.133). No doubt integral to
or consistent with Hamilton’s natural dualism, he regards our knowledge of what
is presented and represented in consciousness — the phenomena of consciousness
— as ‘a direct, immediate, irrespective, determinate, individual, and adequate
cognition’ (LL.I.131). Such cognitions of the phenomena of consciousness, though
virtually self-sufficient as cognitions, do not, for Hamilton, constitute thought, or
so it would seem, since repeatedly he construes thought in terms of a relational
or relative process in which the thinking subject is more distinctively active or
operates as an agent conditioning the objects of thought. Hence, by contrast with
the mere phenomena of consciousness as self-sufficient cognitions, by means of
which the human mind may be thought of as, if not merely sentient, then active
but unthinkingly or non-rationally so, ‘A concept, on the contrary, is an indirect,
mediate, relative, indeterminate, and partial cognition of any one of a number of
objects, but not an actual representation either of them all, or of the whole at-
tributes of any one object’ (LL.I.131). This means that concepts are non-absolute
or ‘not capable of representation as absolute attributes’ (LL.I.137). Earlier, in
attempting to explain the inadequacy of concepts and their relativity, Hamilton
pointed up the partiality of concepts, their dependence upon selective ‘represen-
tation of a part only of the various attributes or characters of which an individual
object is the sum’ — for example, as we think Socrates through a particularly
small range of attributes, say, man, biped, animal, our representation of him will
be proportionately less adequate than when we think him through a greater range
of attributes. Hence, a concept, construed as a collection of attributes to which
the concept refers, are always one-sided or partial and to a greater or lesser extent
inadequate by contrast with the plenitude of attributes that constitute any given
individual.
However, this partiality or incompleteness of concepts, arising due to the com-
bined act of abstraction and attention that conceiving necessarily involves, while
it suggests the relativism of the thinking subject’s conditioning influence on the
objects of thought, does not seem to be the relativity that Hamilton particularly
wishes to emphasise. Instead, the relativity of concepts to which he draws our
attention inheres in the relational nature that a concept does not overtly make
explicit but rather, in a sense, disguises by means of the fiction and even illusion
of unitariness we tend to impose upon the collection of more or less resembling
but nonetheless differing individual attributes that comprise any given concept.
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According to Hamilton, ‘A concept or notion, as the result of a comparison, neces-
sarily expresses a relation. It is, therefore, not cognisable in itself, that is, it affords
no absolute or irrespective object of knowledge, but can only be realised in con-
sciousness by applying it, as a term of relation, to one or more of the objects, which
agree in the point or points of resemblance which it expresses’ (LL.I.128). Although
Hamilton’s account of the relativity of concepts is far from being unproblematic, he
asserts that the passage just quoted resolves ‘the whole mystery of Generalisation
and General Terms’ and thus that his notion (that a concept expresses a relation,
and is not therefore an ‘absolute or irrespective object of knowledge’) resolves the
disputes between Conceptualists and Nominalists. That concepts constitute ab-
solutes or objects of knowledge is an ‘illusion’ that fundamentally arises due to
our conversion of similarity into identity, and thereby, according to Hamilton, ‘the
real plurality of resembling qualities in nature is factitiously reduced to a unity in
thought; and this unity obtains a name in which its relativity, not being expressed,
is still further removed from observation’ (LL.I.128).
This may sound as though Hamilton is saying that concepts are fundamen-
tally fallacious; that they are fallaciously unities, actually pluralities. However,
it needs to be noted that while he may be saying that the view that concepts
are absolute objects of knowledge, or that they express unities, arises due to our
conversion of similarity into identity, the illusion of concepts as objective abso-
lutes thus generated is not due to some inherent fallaciousness within our mental
faculties. Rather, this illusion is due to an insufficiently rigorous attention to the
internal components, structure, and relational processes involved in any given in-
stance of conceiving as deeply integrant to the characteristic features and nature of
the product of such thought, namely, a concept. Furthermore, as he later argues,
concepts, formed by comparison and hence relative or expressive of a relation, ‘can
only be thought of in relation to some one of the individual objects they classify’,
but as such ‘they fall back into mere special determinations of the individual ob-
ject in which they are represented. Thus it is, that the generality or universality of
concepts is potential, not actual’ (LL.I.134). Though Hamilton does not go on to
explain that this implies that concepts have to be regarded always as in some sense
provisional and thereby capable of modification, supplementation, or some other
adjustment, and available for examination from differing points of view, this rel-
ativist attack on the implicit absolutism of concepts construed as non-relativistic
objects of knowledge, is further pursued by Hamilton’s excursus into the role of
language in a way that further brings to the fore the sense in which concepts are
provisional artefacts, the establishment and permanence of which is dependent on
the human subject — that concepts are necessarily subjective.
He apologizes for his digression into the extra-logical domain of metaphysics, a
metaphysics which he admittedly here only sketches (LL.I.131). However, it would
seem that, for Hamilton, in order to analyse the products of thought (concepts) as
principal components within demonstrative arguments, we need to understand the
relativity of concepts by making this explicit. To do so may involve some digression
into metaphysical discourse, and even the enunciation of a metaphysical standpoint
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consistent with or flowing out of Hamilton’s natural dualist position, a position
more or less contentious for some readers but of substantive interest in relation to
the Scottish Common Sense tradition in philosophy out of which Hamilton devel-
oped the term ‘natural dualism’. Clearly concerned that his constriction of Logic
to the necessary laws of thought is being violated by metaphysical considerations,
he also apologizes for digressing onto a similarly extra-logical consideration of lan-
guage. However, just as metaphysical discourse is at the interface between Logic
and the nature of the object-matter of Logic, an important part of Hamilton’s
description of the generation of concepts as illusorily absolute unities or objects of
knowledge, though actually relative, is his eloquent and fairly extensive treatment
of language. He attempts to explain how a name or term or linguistic sign some-
how fixes a concept within our consciousness as though it expresses an absolute
object of knowledge and not a process or relational bundle of attributes brought
together by some contributing act or relationship of agency by means of which the
thinking subject participates with or conditions the phenomena of consciousness
to make its otherwise chaotic or confused and unfixed plenitude meaningful.
His digression onto the relationship between language and thought further deep-
ens the relativism of his whole approach as he brings to the fore the reciprocal
nature of language and thought: ‘Considered in general, thought and language
are reciprocally dependent; each bears all the imperfections and perfections of the
other; but without language there could be no knowledge realised of the essential
properties of things, and of the connection of their accidental states’ (LL.I.137).
He prioritises thought over speech or language but does so in such a way as to
suggest that this priority really pertains to the origination of the phenomenon of
language rather than being a necessary condition of all speech (see LL.I.138). Be
that as it may, Hamilton’s more important concern has to do with describing the
reciprocal relationship between thought and language, the process of conception
and the claim that, were it not for our ability to fix ‘and ratify in a verbal sign’ all
of the constituents of a concept, it would otherwise ‘fall back into the confusion
and infinitude from which it has been called out’ (LL.I.137). He illustrates this
for his students with some nice metaphors, such as the following:
You have all heard of the process of tunnelling, of tunnelling through
a sand bank. In this operation it is impossible to succeed, unless every
foot, nay almost every inch in our progress, be secured by an arch of
masonry, before we attempt the excavation of another. Now, language
is to the mind precisely what the arch is to the tunnel. The power of
thinking and the power of excavation are not dependent on the word
in the one case, on the mason-work in the other; but without these
subsidiaries, neither process could be carried on beyond its rudimentary
commencement (LL.I.139).
Hamilton elaborates upon the metaphor of tunnelling through a sandbank, but
while his simple claim may be altogether unexceptionable (that without language
thought would at best remain in the most elementary and fragile state of almost
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total impermanence), it is interesting to note that what his tunnelling metaphor
most strongly indicates is the relationship that the thinking subject is caught
within, a relationship between the ever-shifting sand of a multitudinous plenum
and the crafting of signs that, unlike the relative nature of concepts with regard to
their constituent parts, may seem to render in some sense or to some degree per-
manent for consciousness the collected attributes of any given concept, but which
still leaves such concepts relative and factitiously unitary. But as the thinking
subject’s struggle to secure or make permanent through language the confusion
and infinitude of the phenomena of consciousness is here highlighted, Hamilton’s
awareness of Logic’s contest with a disintegrative atomism or absolute relativism,
at once suggests his consciousness of the volitional nature of reason and the abyss
of a more thoroughgoing relativism that threatens to undermine the warrantabil-
ity of his project entirely. But though this exaggerates the danger of Hamilton’s
relativism with regard to his own project, it draws to our attention the acute sense
that Hamilton has of logic’s relationship through language to the surrounding and
teeming chaos of the universe within which our intellects struggle to achieve order
— logic, like language, is for Hamilton a process of inching forward, of a tunnelling
through sand only made possible by constructing arches to hold back and make
orderly the chaos that perpetually threatens to engulf us. Any elementary con-
cepts we might have the capacity to form without the assistance of language, which
Hamilton admits may be a possibility, would be ‘but sparks which would twinkle
only to expire’, implying that without language, and we must add, without logic,
whatever thought might be possible is barely worth considering (LL.I.139). It is
therefore of the greatest moment for Hamilton that the logic we construct should
be robust and built upon proper foundations established through the most exact-
ing scrutiny of the work of others — this is not just a task for those who profess
to be logicians; it is also a task involving sound architectural skills, considerable
scholarship, the craftsmanship of the master builder, and a critical engagement
with and demolition of the crumbling and imperfect buildings of the past.
But it all must be carried out with an acute consciousness of the materials one
has to work with and the instability of the substance that only logic can hold in
place. Hamilton has, more or less wittingly, but nonetheless in a most profound
way, highlighted the imperfect, inchoate, factitious, anthropocentric, volitional,
indeterminate, and inherently relative nature of concepts. However, in doing so
he has overburdened the tenability of the fixative term or word or sign to such
an extent that the permanence or ratification he seems to claim we are capable
of establishing or ascribing to concepts — their ‘acquired permanence’ as he later
describes it (LL.I.225) — begins to look questionable. That this should be the case
— that Hamilton’s conceptualism is in fact a dismantling of Logic’s object-matter
into a purely formal kind of object that describes a process only artificially or
analogically rendered as a material object consisting of identifiable components —
should perhaps not greatly surprise us, given that this idealism or immaterialism
is so clearly congruent with his doctrine of nescience, and several other aspects of
his philosophical position related to this doctrine.
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But this is not to say that Hamilton actually undercuts the whole point of
examining concepts and attempting to evolve a more complete science of the nec-
essary laws of thought. Rather, it is to his credit that, as he persists with his
enquiry, though the relativism and in general the perilously fragile condition of
concepts (as factitiously wholes, and indeed thereby factitiously permanent fixtures
in consciousness), is brought to his students’ attention, he effectually engages in a
quasi-Kantian critique of reason that at once points up the queerness, or idealism,
of Logic’s object-matter, while yet exploring what can be made determinate and
placed under the regulation of irrefragable laws with regard to thought, an entity
that he brings before us with great authenticity not as something already fixed or
identical or closely analogous to material entities and physical nature (or to con-
ceptions of physical nature that construe the material mechanistically), but rather
as an object-matter evincing an indeterminacy with which it behoves exacting
logical scrutiny to engage.
Having pointed up the indeterminate and relative nature of concepts he goes on
to discuss the three main relations of concepts, namely, the relation they hold to
their objects, to their subject, and to each other. The first relation, to their objects,
is of course encapsulated by the term ‘quantity’ since all concepts are said to consist
of a greater or lesser number of attributes (the objects of a concept). However,
as is now well known but, according to Hamilton, had been largely overlooked
by many contemporaneous and earlier logicians, the quantity of a concept can be
distinguished into two different kinds, denominated by the terms ‘extension’ and
‘intension’ (or Hamilton’s more frequently used term ‘comprehension’). Although
the terms ‘extension’ and ‘intension’ are well known to present-day logicians, that
Hamilton regarded his contemporaries as being largely ignorant of these terms and
that their importance to his own attempts to improve traditional logic is so great,
provides at least two good reasons for elucidating his treatment of these terms
here.
He claims that the distinction between extension and intension ‘forms the very
cardinal point on which the whole theory of Logic turns’ (LL.I.119). He buttresses
this claim by repeatedly returning to the significance of his distinction between and
treatment of Extension and Intension in several later lectures, for example, when he
argues that propositions can be distinguished as Intensive or Extensive depending
on whether the subject or the predicate is respectively the containing whole (see,
LL.I.231-3). However, as we shall see, the way in which he handles this distinction
further deepens his underlying notion concerning the relativity of concepts to show,
by demonstrating how extension and intension are correlatives of one another, that
a relativistic analysis of concepts and arguments is possible and indeed further
evolves the science of Pure Logic. However, importantly, the relativistic analysis
that Hamilton’s coordination of extension and intension enables, is one that is
nonetheless anchored in the fundamental rule of containment, namely, the axiom
which ‘constitutes the one principle of all Deductive reasoning’, ‘that the part of a
part is a part of the whole’ (LL.I.119, 145, 144). It is perhaps worth pointing out
that this axiom is also given in two Latin phrases by Hamilton, one of which is:
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‘Prœdicatum prœdicati est prœdicatum subjecti’. The Editor of his lectures points
out in a footnote that this is ‘A translation of Aristotle’s first antipredicamental
rule as given in the Categories (see LL.I.144).
Hamilton’s thorough and fairly extended explication of extension and intension
in his Lecture VIII may be summarised as follows: a concept is a thought that
embraces or, in the sense explained earlier, brings into unity an indefinite plurality
of characters and it is also applicable to an indefinite plurality of objects about
which it may be said, or through which these objects may be thought. As such,
a concept is a quantity of two different and opposed kinds, denoted by the terms
‘Intension’ and ‘Extension’ (LL.I.140-52).
‘Extension’ refers to the external quantity of a concept, being determined by
the number of objects — concepts or realities — to which the concept may be
applied or which it classifies and hence under which these entities are said to be
contained (a concept’s extensive quantity is comprised of the number of objects
that can be thought mediately through the concept). The extensive quantity of a
concept is also referred to as its sphere or breadth and ‘the parts which the total
concept contains, are said to be contained under it, because, holding the relation
to it of the particular to the general, they are subordinated or ranged under it.
For example, the concepts man, horse, dog, &c., are contained under the more
general concept animal’ (LL.I.145). When these parts of a concept’s Extension
are exposed, this is called Division.
‘Intension’ refers to the internal quantity of a concept, being determined by the
number of objects — concepts or realities — that constitute the concept and hence
in which these entities are said to be contained (a concept’s intensive quantity
is the conceived sum of the attributes that constitute it, formed into a whole
or unity in thought). The intensive quantity of a concept is also referred to as
its comprehension or depth and ‘the parts [. . . ] which go to constitute the total
concept, are said to be contained in it. For example, the concept man is composed
of two constituent parts or attributes, that is, of two partial concepts,–rational and
animal ; for the characters rational and animal are only an analytical expression
of the synthetic unity of the concept man’ (LL.I.143-4). When these parts or
characters of a concept’s Intension are exposed, this is called Definition.
According to Hamilton, logicians ‘have exclusively developed’ the Extensive
quantity of concepts. However, he asserts that the Extensive and Intensive quan-
tities comprise ‘the two great branches of reasoning’ and that Intension ‘is at least
of equal importance’ in comparison with Extension (LL.I.144-5). This claim is
significant in that, placing Intension and Extension on an equal footing, as two
main branches of reasoning, immediately brings the analysis of concepts under, as
it were, dual aspects or two main perspectives from which concepts may be viewed,
analysed, and through which Hamilton can further elaborate his thesis concerning
the relativity of concepts by bringing any given concept’s Extensive and Intensive
quantities into relation with one another — which is precisely what he does at
this stage in his Lectures as also in Discussions and his ‘New Analytic of Logical
Forms’.
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Hamilton seems to suggest at this stage what he will later make much more ex-
plicit, that the axiom or fundamental and sole principle of all Deductive reasoning,
that a part of a part is a part of the whole, originates with regard to the Intensive
quantity of concepts — he certainly introduces this axiom of containment by il-
lustrating how the Intensive quantity of a given concept, such as is signified in the
term ‘man’, may be analysed into ever diminishing parts contained in, or implicit
within, the concept ‘man’, ‘till we reach attributes which, as simple, stand as a
primary or ultimate element, into which the series can be resolved’ (LL.I.144). If
he is suggesting that the axiom of containment has been, as it were, translated
for application to the Extensive quantity by the notion expressed as ‘whatever is
contained under the partial or more particular concept is contained under the total
or more general concept’, it is unclear whether he is at all troubled by the idea
that the necessity of relation implicit in the axiom of containment, particularly as
expressed with regard to a concept’s Intension, is grounded on an analogy with
physical containment that he elsewhere rejects as unwarranted — that is, with re-
gard to the assumption that mind and body are analogically related, (LL.I.145).35
However, he has effectually described concepts as necessarily factitious or artificial
constructions, given a kind of sufficient or provisionally adequate permanence by
means of language. He has also described concepts as relative continua in thought,
the analysis of which is itself, purposive or tendentiously conducted in order that
we can, as I have indicated earlier, both speak about and thereby better compre-
hend concepts (see LL.I.133). Thus, Hamilton can perhaps claim some licence in
deploying terms such as ‘contain’ without issuing caveats to guard against some
of the assumptions antithetical to his general philosophical standpoint of natural
dualism that, as a term analogically related to physical containment, ‘contain’
itself may be said to contain or imply. However, Hamilton is relying upon a tradi-
tional technical language of containment to elucidate the Intensive and Extensive
quantities which he will later claim is better replaced by the more accurate ‘sub-
stantive verb, (is, is not)’ to express the equation or affirmation or negation of
identity between a given concept and the objects constitutive of it or to which it
may be related (or through which other concepts or particulars may be thought)
(LL.I.154). As we shall see later, he does regard the axiom or sole principle of all
Deductive reasoning (that a part of a part is a part of the whole), as rather cru-
cially originating in a thought unshakeably natural to us, namely, our knowledge
of the quantity of Intension and the ways in which Intensive containment provides
as it were a natural grounding for all purely logical inference — Hamilton, stren-
uously striving to craft Logic into a pure science, abstracted from all extra-logical
matters, cannot resist bringing the laws of thought into an intimate relation with
the natural, the human as irrevocably an interrelated whole consisting of the self
and the not-self.
But this aside, he applies the axiom of containment to both the Intensive and
the Extensive quantities of concepts. Both may be said to contain attributes, but
they crucially differ in that, while the Intensive quantity is said to be contained in
35Discussions, pp. 61-2.
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a concept, the Extensive is said to be contained under it. Thus, while both of the
quantities of Extension and Intension contain in differing senses, and while both
are determined by wholes that may be identified and thereby quantified, ‘These
two quantities are not convertible. On the contrary, they are in the inverse ratio of
each other; the greater the depth of comprehension [Intension] of a notion the less
its breadth or extension, and vice versa’ (LL.I.142). This inverse ratio relationship
between Extension and Intension is well illustrated by Hamilton as follows:
When I take out of a concept, that is, abstract from one or more of
its attributes, I diminish its comprehension [Intension]. Thus, when
from the concept man, equivalent to rational animal, I abstract from
the attribute or determination rational, I lessen its internal quantity.
But by this diminution of its comprehension I give it a wider exten-
sion, for what remains is the concept animal, and the concept animal
embraces under it a far greater number of objects than the concept
man (LL.I.147).
Hamilton explains the way in which this inverse ratio operates in fuller detail,
pointing up as he does so that as we continue the analytic process outlined in
the above quotation, the diminishment of a concept’s Intensive quantity, with the
correspondent amplification or expansion of its Extension, must finally result in
‘that concept which all comprehension and all extension must equally contain, but
in which comprehension is at its minimum, extension at its maximum,–I mean
the concept of Being or Existence’ (LL.I.149). And by contrast with this, when a
concept’s Intension is at its maximum, its Extension being then at its minimum,
the concept we must end up with is that of an individual, ‘the concept being
a complement of the whole attributes of an individual object, which, by these
attributes, it thinks and discriminates from every other’ (LL.I.148).
His notion that, when Extension is at a maximum and thereby Intension at a
minimum we must end with existence, raises the interesting topic of the existential
import of concepts and propositions. However, leaving this aside, it should now be
clear that, having described concepts as generally relative, Hamilton is laying bare
the sort of things that this relativity enables with regard to how we may view and
analyse concepts. In an ingenious table in his Discussions, which the editors of the
Lectures appended to the end of Lecture VIII, Hamilton further exposes how their
relational or relative nature enables us to view any given part of a concept under
different relational aspects, for example: as species of a genus from one end, the
genus of a species from its opposite end; how the expansion of a concept’s Extension
implies a coordinate reduction in its Intension; the sense in which we may say that
each part ‘in opposite respects, contains and is contained’ (LL.I.153); and how ‘the
real identity and rational differences of Breadth and Depth’ become exposed, such
that it becomes more apparent that Extension and Intension ‘though denominated
quantities, are, in reality, one and the same quantity, viewed in counter relations
and from opposite ends. Nothing is the one, which is not, pro tanto, the other’
(LL.I.153).
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When explicating these points to do with a concept’s Extension and Intension in
his Lectures Hamilton used ‘a circular machine’ which he had devised. Similar to a
now-familiar child’s toy consisting of a circular base with a wooden rod at its centre
onto which are placed differently coloured circular discs of various circumferences,
the discs of Hamilton’s machine represented concepts that could be placed on the
central rod representing the individual to which these concepts might refer. Each
disc was placed on the rod in the correct order to illustrate several things to do
with the relation of Extension to Intension, the completed device standing as an
inverted cone. This ‘machine’ is represented and discussed by Veitch (see Veitch,
pp. 250-2). As though trying to reinforce Hamilton’s claim that his doctrine of
the quantification of the predicate had been taught in his Lectures prior to de
Morgan’s quantification, the Editors’ insertion of the table and the explanatory
pages from his Discussions at the end of Lecture VIII reveal how his distinction
between Extension (Breadth) and Intension (Depth), and the way in which he
brings these two quantities into relation with one another, form the basis of his
quantification of the predicate. That Hamilton’s editors thought it necessary to do
this, strongly suggests their awareness of how easy it might be not to grasp from
his lectures, the extent to which Hamilton’s treatment of Concepts and the two
principal quantities of Extension and Intension lead to and are indeed an integral
part of Hamilton’s quantification of the predicate. However, the editors’ insertion
of this table is perhaps best understood as an attempt to bring to the fore the
very sort of thing that it may be assumed Hamilton explained at this stage in his
Lecture VIII by use of his ‘circular machine’. I have reproduced Hamilton’s table
below and shall shortly provide some explanation of how it operates:
The table displays the lines of Breadth and Depth, the conceptual range as
Ideal, the objective or particular range of individuals or singulars as Real, and gives
lines of direction to indicate affirmation and negation (which I shall not attempt
to explain). The table distinguishes between individuals or singulars (z, z′, z′′) and
classes (A,E, I,O, U). The highest genus or widest attribute is given as A,A,A,
etc., the subaltern genera and species as E, I,O,U , and the lowest species or
narrowest attribute as Y . Each class is represented as ‘a series of resemblances
thought as one’, symbolised by the same letter to denote that they are thought of
as one, though really distinct or differing from one another in some respect(s) (this
being intimated by the vertical lines separating each letter). This is in line with
Hamilton’s notion that a concept is relative in the sense that it brings into a unity
in thought what are really discrete though resembling characters. The narrowest
attribute (Y ) is shown as a simple term constituted by the individuals z, z′, z′′.
Though simple or singular in the sense that it has no extension or has a minimal
extension, it is dichotomised by using a thick line ‘|’ to denote ‘not’ — that is to
say, if ‘Y ’ is thinkable, as a strict logical necessity one must also be able to think
‘not Y ’, but the narrowest attribute must otherwise be a singular attribute and
not a class (as in, say, U). This is not to say that some given attribute represented
by ‘Y ’ could not be translated into ‘A’ in another table since any ‘Y ’ is only the
least or narrowest attribute in relation to U and the other letters above this, and
122 Ralph Jessop
Table 1. Schemes of Two Quantitites
(LL.I.152; for further detail see, pp. 152-6, and Discussions, pp. 699-701).
the least must be in thought, if not in fact, a unity or attribute directly relatable
to the individual constituents as shown beneath it. In other words, while the
table posits a narrowest attribute Y , as something not consisting of any other
resembling Y , closer examination of Y ’s Intension could involve translating it into
another table of the same form in which it might be translated into A. As the
thick line ‘|’ denotes ‘not’ (e.g. to contradistinguish between say, ‘animal’ and ‘not
animal’, the thinner lines ‘merely discriminate one animal (A) , from another (A)’
(LL.I.156). Hamilton’s elucidation of the table more clearly begins to indicate just
how his understanding of the relativity of concepts, and what a concept consists in
with regard to the two quantities of Extension and Intension, combine to illustrate
the necessity of quantifying the predicate: ‘A is only A, not A,A,A, &c.; some
Animal is not some Animal; one class of Animals is not all, every, or any other;
this Animal is not that; Socrates is not Plato; z is not z′. On the other hand, E
is EA; and Y is Y UOIEA; every lower and higher letter in the series coalescing
uninterruptedly into a series of reciprocal subjects and predicates, as shown by
the absence of all discriminating lines. Thus Socrates (z′), is Athenian (Y ), Greek
(U), European (O), Man (I), Mammal (E), Animal (A)’ (LL.I.155).
This needs to be further elucidated as follows: reading from left to right, the
first A contains under it the concepts EIOUY , and the full range of all individual
and hence actual Athenians, represented by ‘z, z′, z′′.’ However, the second A
contains under it EIOU , and not Y (‘|Y ’), and hence neither z nor z′ nor z′′. The
The Logic of Sir William Hamilton 123
first A is a term identical qua term to all of the other As in the row of As, and
it resembles (according to the thinking subject) the other As to such an extent as
to be unified in thought and fixed as a unity by means of the single classificatory
or general term ‘A’. However, just as the first A and the second A are in all
respects identical, except that the first A contains under it Y (and hence, in this
case, z′) whereas the second A does not, similarly each of the other As may be
differentiated from one another and from the first A by means of reference to their
respective depths or intensive quantities. This implies that each of the terms A
is, as Hamilton puts it, ‘only A, not A,A,A, &c. [. . . ] one class of Animals is
not all’ (LL.I.155). This suggests the basis of quantification of the subject term in
a simple proposition such as ‘Some Animals are Mammals’. But, as we shall see
shortly, it also suggests the basis of quantifying the predicate term.
Suppose that: A represents the term ‘Animal’; E represents the subordinate
or species ‘Mammal’ to A as the genus Animal; I represents the subordinate or
species ‘Man’ to E as the genus Mammal. For ease of explanation it is necessary
to follow Hamilton and ignore a reasoning that starts by quantifying the class
with the universal term ‘All’, for it can easily be seen that were we to commence,
in Breadth, with ‘All A’ (‘all Animal’) then, contained under this class are ‘All
E and some not E’ (‘all Mammal and some not Mammal’, which unnecessarily
complicates explication of how Hamilton’s table demonstrates the need to quantify
the predicate. Now, if we only attend to the range encompassed by the first five
As, then this implies we must only be looking at some A and not all (in this
case the first five). What is contained under these five As is the range of all Es
(i.e. ‘not E’ (‘|E’)) has been excluded by abstracting or ignoring the sixth A).
Translating this selection of the first five As and the range of Es listed under them,
we have ‘some Animals are all Mammals.’ This process can of course be continued
by repeating the process of removing one attribute or class of E, so that the next
step in the reasoning process that examines what is contained under E, involves
a further abstraction or removal of, in this case, the 4th E, resulting in: ‘Some E
(Mammals) are all I (Man)’, and so on.
If this begins to illustrate how reducing the Extension of a concept deepens or
expands its Depth, and vice versa — the inverse ratio principle Hamilton claims to
exist between Extension and Intension — the table also illustrates that, in effect,
the same reasoning can be applied whether we are arguing in Depth (i.e. with
regard to the Intensive quantity) or in Breadth (i.e. with regard to the Extensive
quantity). This, according to Hamilton, is because, ‘Though different in the order
of thought, (ratione), the two quantities are identical in the nature of things, (re).
Each supposes the other; and Breadth is not more to be distinguished from Depth,
than the relations of the sides, from the relations of the angles, of a triangle.’
(LL.I.154). The table illustrates how the same reasoning can be applied to both
the Extension and Intension of a concept, so long as both the subject term and
the predicate term in all of the resulting propositions are quantified consistently
in accordance with the correct understanding of what the table indicates at each
step in the reasoning with regard to containment (in or under). Hamilton’s own
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illustration of this is as follows:
In effect it is precisely the same reasoning, whether we argue in Depth
— “z′ is, (i.e. as subject, contains in it the inherent attribute), some Y ;
all Y is some U ; all U is some O; all O is some I; all I is some E; all E
is some A — therefore, z′ is some A:” or whether we argue in Breadth
— “Some A is, (i.e. as class, contains under it the subject part), all E;
some E is all I; some I is all O; some O is all U ; some U is all Y ; some
Y is z′ — therefore, some A is z′.” The two reasonings, internally
identical, are externally the converse of each other; the premise and
term, which in Breadth is major, in Depth is minor. (LL.I.154)
But, as this displays how the inverse ratio principle operates, and how so relating
Extension and Intension reveals that it is only externally that the two quantities
determine a difference in reasoning whereas, with each term consistently quantified
using ‘some’ or ‘all’ as appropriate, subjects and predicates can swap position to
yield formally identical conclusions (‘z′ is some A’ and ‘some A is z′’), Hamilton
is quick to point out in this more developed treatment of the topic explicating
his ‘Schemes of the Two Quantities’ table that: ‘In syllogisms also, where the
contrast of the two quantities [Extension and Intension] is abolished, there, with
the difference of figure, the differences of major and minor premise and term fall
likewise.’ (LL.I.154). With these few words Hamilton is touching on just how,
through examining concepts Extensively and Intensively to show the inverse ratio
relationship between these two quantities, the resultant quantification of all terms
in a reasoning that hinges on the identification of the subject and predicate terms
of a proposition, enables a significant simplification of traditional Formal Logic.
However, he is also touching on a claim, the significance of which he brings to
the fore much later in his Lectures, namely, that ‘In fact, the two quantities and
the two quantifications have by logicians been neglected together ’ (LL.I.155). As
attending to the quantities of Extension and Intension reveals their ‘real identity
and rational differences’, such that it becomes more apparent that they are ‘in
reality, one and the same quantity’, Hamilton will later show, through careful
stages of his teaching of logic in the Lectures, that this identification of the two
quantities is highly significant with regard to both propositions and syllogisms
(LL.I.153; compare Discussions, pp. 701–2). However, before the full relevance of
Hamilton’s inverse ratio principle with regard to Extension and Intension can be
illuminated with regard to propositions and syllogisms, it is necessary to outline
some of the other points he makes in his Lectures concerning concepts.
If by the end of Lecture VIII it is beginning to emerge, particularly with the ed-
itors’ helpful insertion of Hamilton’s ‘Schemes of the Two Quantities’ table given
above, that Hamilton is carefully working towards his quantification of the predi-
cate, in some of the Lectures that follow, he still has much to say that will further
reinforce his notion that concepts are relative, not simply in the sense that they
are relational (or wholes constituted by and referring to a plurality of resembling
entities, or relative with regard to their objects), but also in the sense that our
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construction and grasp of the depth (Intension) and breadth (Extension) of any
given concept is dependent upon a subjective interrelation of clearness/obscurity
and distinctness/indistinctness. This introduces the notion of the quality of a
concept (see LL.I.157).
Thus, having elucidated the inverse ratio relation between the Extension and In-
tension of a concept, he goes on to consider the subjective relation of concepts (i.e.
the relation to the subject that thinks a concept) in relation to their clearness and
distinctness as similarly relative terms determining the quality of a given concept.
He explains the terms ‘clearness’ and ‘distinctness’ at some length, acknowledging
as he does so a considerable debt to Leibniz (see LL.I.159–65).
Hamilton points out that while intensive distinctness is at a maximum when we
reach simple notions that are thereby indefinable, and while extensive distinctness
is at a maximum when, to quote his translation of Esser, ‘we touch on notions
which, as individual, admit of no ulterior division’, such distinctness is only ideal
and that in fact this ideal distinctness is something we are always approaching
but never in reality attaining (LL.I.170). As this ideal distinctness is regarded
by Esser as an incentive to re-analyse the intension and extension of concepts,
it is clear that Hamilton is suggesting to his students that this relativity and
incompleteness or non-absolute condition of concepts is an important aspect of his
overall approach to the study of Logic, a crucial incorporation of an awareness of
the ultimate indefinability and non-absolute dimension of Logic’s object matter.
And in this Hamilton is arguably being entirely consistent with other aspects of
his metaphysics and overall philosophical position.
In Lecture X Hamilton has more to say about the imperfection of concepts, this
time returning to the problem of language. Concepts have, as it were, a propensity
to be obscure and indistinct and these vices are due, partly to their very nature as
wholes that bind together ‘a multiplicity in unity’, and partly from their depen-
dence upon language as that which fixes concepts in consciousness (LL.I.172). He
explains the problem of language by means of an illustrative analogy with methods
of exchange in countries lacking an established currency. Thus, language operates
much like the handing over of unquantified bags of precious metals which may
or may not be closely scrutinised to see if they yield the value they purportedly
signify — on most occasions the language user takes on trust that a particular
term binds together what it seems to claim for itself, namely, that it does in fact
represent a multitude of entities collectively amounting to a certain sum or value;
but at other times, this will not be the case. This analogy of course teems with
significance but there seem to be two main points that Hamilton is attempting to
emphasise: firstly, ‘that notions or concepts are peculiarly liable to great vagueness
and ambiguity, and that their symbols are liable to be passed about without the
proper kind, or the adequate amount, of thought’ (LL.I.173-4); and secondly, that
an important distinction, originated by Leibniz, can be made with regard to our
knowledge that divides cognition into the blind or symbolical and intuitive (see
LL.I.180-86). In short, Leibniz’s notion of symbolical knowledge refers to concepts
as terms taken to signify entities obscurely and imperfectly presented to the mind
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but which may potentially be exposed or made explicit, though we cannot think
all of the ingredients that comprise the symbol or term used to refer to them. By
contrast with this, intuitive knowledge is of these ingredients themselves inasmuch
as this is possible. Hamilton fails to explain the significance of this distinction
except to claim that thereby Leibniz and his followers in Germany superseded
or overcame ‘the whole controversy of Nominalism and Conceptualism,–which, in
consequence of the non-establishment of this distinction, and the relative imperfec-
tion of our philosophical language, has idly agitated the Psychology of this country
[Britain] and of France’ (LL.I.179). However, it should be fairly obvious that by
means of this distinction between symbolical and intuitive knowledge, Hamilton
is providing a warrant for treating concepts in a purely formal manner in order to
examine more closely the relations between concepts considered blindly or symbol-
ically, while at the same time drawing attention to the interface between what the
symbols represent with regard to the imperfect but real condition of our intuitive
knowledge of the particulars to which concepts relate, and through which we both
think these particulars and constitute our concepts. Once again, the relativism,
imperfection, inchoateness, and mutability of concepts and the phenomenal and
plural nature of our knowledge as relative, relational, provisional, and so on, is
being emphasised by Hamilton, while at the same time he attempts to establish
a domain or object matter of Logic at once stable, constricted, and discriminated
from the material or actual, though both domains of the intuitive and symbolical
are held in relation to one another as mutually informative and only theoretically
discrete.
Though Hamilton is clearly aware that his various points concerning the rel-
ativity of concepts is foregrounding matter that might easily be thought of as
extra-logical, having distinguished between symbolical and intuitive knowledge, in
Lecture XI he appropriately turns to what he regards as ‘The Relation proper’ of
concepts, namely, their relation to each other — something that can be represented
symbolically and diagrammatically and which thereby establishes a set of relation-
ships familiar to logicians. Again he discusses this in relation to the two principal
quantities of Extension and Intension. Taking Extension first, he outlines five
principal relations: Exclusion, Coextension, Subordination, Co-ordination, and
Intersection. All of these he illustrates with simple circle diagrams, a practice
used by some earlier philosophers, such as, according to Hamilton, the late 16th
century Christian Wiese, and of course developed later by John Venn. It is need-
less to reproduce Hamilton’s diagrams (see LL.I.189; 256), but it is important
to note that of all of these relations between concepts considered with regard to
their Extension, ‘those of Subordination and Co-ordination are of principal im-
portance, as on them reposes the whole system of classification’ (LL.I.189-90).
He elucidates Subordination and Co-ordination with crystal clarity. However, as
yet further evidence of his interest in and even fascination with relativism, he
continues to draw into consideration: that there is no absolute exclusion in the
relation between concepts known as Exclusion (LL.I.188); the ways in which our
perspective on concepts results in re-describing a genus as a species and a species
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as a genus; how speculatively, if not practically, we may always divide a concept
ad infinitum (LL.I.192-3); how different abstractions result in different relations
of genus and species in both subordination and co-ordination; and how, admitting
that there can be both a highest genus and a lowest species, neither of which
are convertible into a species nor a genus respectively, within Subordination there
are gradations of genus and species known as subalterns or intermediates such
that, the genus lower than the highest genus, can become a species, whereas the
species higher than the lowest species, can become a genus. This, as Hamilton
points out all comes from Porphyry’s Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, but it
is nonetheless notable that Hamilton should emphasise the non-absolute aspects
of the relations between concepts and the dependence of these various reversals
of species and genus on how we regard them (LL.I.196). Point of view is indeed
something he is at pains to emphasise as important to several matters, not least
of which is the relation of whole to part and the distinction, which he regards
as erroneous, between Logical and Metaphysical wholes, these being, contra to
previous logicians, ‘equally logical’ (see LL.I.201-2).
Hamilton is evidently working towards some important claims to do with the
whole-part relationship that will give priority to the Intensive quantity of concepts
which in part relies upon his notion of Involution (see LL.I.202-3). Skipping over
the various kinds of whole that Hamilton elucidates, the notion that a genus con-
tains its species either potentially or actually (see LL.I.205-6), along with various
other points of interest, it is in Hamilton’s treatment of Comprehension or the
quantity of Intension in Lecture XII that he first makes fully explicit one of his
major disagreements with traditional logic, a disagreement nevertheless that he
has been hinting at in one way or another from a fairly early stage. He claims that
the relations of Involution and Co-ordination have been:
altogether neglected by logicians: and, in consequence of this, they
have necessarily overlooked one of the two great divisions of all reason-
ing [. . . ]. In each quantity there is a deductive, and in each quantity
there is an inductive, inference; and if the reasoning under either of
these two quantities were to be omitted, it ought, perhaps, to have
been the one which the logicians have exclusively cultivated [i.e. the
deductive reasoning in Extension]. For the quantity of extension is a
creation of the mind itself, and only created through, as abstracted
from, the quantity of comprehension [Intension]; whereas the quantity
of comprehension is at once given in the very nature of things. The
former quantity is thus secondary and factitious, the latter primary
and natural. (LL.I.217-8).
Now, it must be noted that by the term ‘inductive’ Hamilton departs from what
we might call the standard treatment of or distinction between induction and
deduction. Thus, he does not mean that kind of inference in which the conclusion
may be said to exceed or amplify the content of the premises. He is not talking here
about probable reasoning or judgements that go beyond what is delivered in the
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premises — his restriction of induction to a form of necessary reasoning is therefore
substantially different from the empirical reasoning or induction of the physical
sciences. Instead, as he makes clear in a later lecture, he is treating induction in a
formal sense as differentiated from an informal or material sense, to mean a process
of reasoning from all of the parts to the whole that these parts entirely constitute
(see LL.I.319-26). This aside, that he is now distinguishing as he does in the above
quotation between Extension and Intension may seem to be at odds with the claim
he made earlier about concepts being factitiously unities, but really pluralities —
now it would seem they are only partially factitious, projected, mind-dependent
and mind-generated, but partially ‘primary and natural’. Also, this prioritisation
of Intension seems to sit uncomfortably with his attempt to hold, by means of his
inverse ratio relation between the two quantities, that Extension and Intension
are non-convertible but equivalent with regard to the reasoning that we apply to
both quantities. Leaving aside this weaker objection, that he has now introduced
a distinction between Extension and Intension that prioritises Intension as the
real and primary, creates problems for Hamilton that he does not satisfactorily
resolve. For example, is not the Intensive quantity also a binding together of
resembling but nonetheless discrete entities held in a relationship of containing
and contained, and thus is not Intension every bit as factitious as Extension?
Furthermore, how can an abstraction from the Intensive quantity be satisfactorily
described as factitious, given that it is just that, an abstraction from what is
not factitious but rather ‘in the very nature of things’? Perhaps, by ‘factitious’
Hamilton is merely asserting that, in relation to the thinking subject, Extension is
a product of the mental action of abstracting from the real, Intensive quantity, and
in this sense the product that is a concept’s Extensive quantity may be more or less
arbitrarily or selectively constructed, that Extension is both factitiously a unity,
really a plurality of resembling attributes, and that its factiousness in relation
to the reality of a given concept’s Intension is a matter of degree. That is to
say, both with regard to the degree of resemblance between a concept’s attributes
in Extension, and with regard to how close its Extension is to its definition, its
distinctness, or the thinking subject’s grasp of its Intensive quantity, the Extensive
quantity may be more or less factitious.
Be that as it may, Hamilton does seem to be making an important distinction
and claim here that may be more sympathetically understood as an attempt to
ground in reality the formation of our concepts as emanating from or evolving out
of a deeper or more intimately connected relationship of resemblance between the
parts of a whole than is tenable of the resembling attributes in Extension. He does
this by pointing up the difference between the senses of ‘contain’: in Extension
a concept contains under it, its various attributes in subordination; whereas in
Intension, a concept contains in it, its various attributes as constitutive of and as
the definitional properties that make the concept what it is, just as the multitude
of parts go together to constitute any given individual. To distinguish between
these two different senses of ‘contain’, Hamilton introduces the notion of Involution
mentioned above, which he explains as follows:
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In the quantity of comprehension [Intension], one notion is involved in
another, when it forms a part of the sum total of characters, which
together constitute the comprehension of that other; and two notions
are in this quantity co-ordinated, when, whilst neither comprehends the
other, both are immediately comprehended in the same lower concept.
(LL.I.220).
He gives two illustrations of the Involution relationship between a concept’s at-
tributes, the second of these pointing up the inter-relatedness of concepts as in-
volving and involved, such that we may be said to think a certain concept only in
and through that of another concept:
In this quantity [of Intension] the involving notion or whole is the more
complex notion; the involved notion or part is the more simple. Thus
pigeon as comprehending bird, bird as comprehending feathered, feath-
ered as comprehending warm-blooded, warm-blooded as comprehend-
ing heart with four cavities, heart with four cavities as comprehending
breathing with lungs, are severally to each other as notions involving
and involved. (LL.I.223).
Suggesting as this does, a relative overlapping and even partial integration of one
concept with another, such that they mutually imply and yet collectively consti-
tute the individual or unity they define, he immediately follows this somewhat
sketchy account of Involution, by differentiating between this relativist aspect
(containing and contained) and the non-relative (since not necessarily containing
and contained) co-ordination:
Again, notions, in the whole of comprehension, are co-ordinated, when
they stand together as constituting parts of the notion in which they
are both immediately comprehended. Thus the characters oviparous
[egg producing] and warm-blooded, heart with four cavities, and breath-
ing with lungs, as all immediately contributing to make up the com-
prehension of the notion bird, are, in this respect, severally considered
as its co-ordinate parts. These characters are not relative and co-
relative,–not containing and contained. For we have oviparous animals
which are not warm-blooded, and warm-blooded animals which are
not oviparous. Again, it is true, I believe, that all warm-blooded ani-
mals have hearts with four cavities [. . . ], and that all animals with such
hearts breathe by lungs and not by gills, But then, in this case, we have
no right to suppose that the first of these characters comprehends the
second, and that the second comprehends the third. For we should be
equally entitled to assert, that all animals breathing by lungs possessed
hearts of four cavities, and that all animals with such hearts are warm-
blooded. They are thus thought as mutually the conditions of each
other; and whilst we may not know their reciprocal dependence, they
are, however, conceived by us, as on an equal footing of co-ordination.
(LL.I.223)
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Hamilton hints that the significance of Involution and Co-ordination will come to
the fore when he later moves on to tackle the syllogism and, seemingly regarding
this as virtually a digression, his explanation of Involution in Lecture XII is un-
fortunately rather brief and might have been more fully elucidated, particularly
given that it may be much more crucial than perhaps Hamilton realised, to how we
might best understand at least one major aspect to do with the co-identity rela-
tionship within universal propositions which I shall discuss in Section IV. However,
he says just about enough to suggest what one might call a grounding relativism in
which his few words on this, though offered to explain the wholeness of a concept’s
Intensive quantity, verge on further pointing up the artificial nature of the funda-
mental laws of logic of identity, excluded middle, and non-contradiction. If this is
less evident in the above quotation, it is more so in how he relates the involution
within a concept’s Intensive quantity to his non-linear notion of the formation or
evolution of general and particular terms:
Our notions are originally evolved out of the more complex into the
more simple, and [. . . ] the progress of science is nothing more than a
progressive unfolding into distinct consciousness of the various elements
comprehended in the characters, originally known to us in their vague
or confused totality [the condition in which they may be said to be
maximally complex].
It is a famous question among philosophers,–Whether our knowledge
commences with the general or with the individual,–whether children
first employ common, or first employ proper, names. In this con-
troversy, the reasoners have severally proved the opposite opinion to
be untenable; but the question is at once solved, by showing that a
third opinion is the true,–viz. that our knowledge commences with the
confused and complex, which, as regarded in one point of view or in
another, may easily be mistaken either for the individual, or for the
general. [. . . ]. It is sufficient to say in general, that all objects are
presented to us in complexity; that we are at first more struck with
the points of resemblance than with the points of contrast; that the
earliest notions, and consequently, the earliest terms, are those that
correspond to this synthesis, while the notions and the terms arising
from an analysis of this synthesis into its parts, are of a subsequent
formation. But though it be foreign to the province of Logic to de-
velop the history of this procedure; yet, as this procedure is natural to
the human mind, Logic must contain the form by which it is regulated.
It must not only enable us to reason from the simple and general to
the complex and individual; it must likewise, enable us to reverse the
process, and to reason from the complex and individual to the simple
and the general. And this it does by that relation of notions as contain-
ing and contained, given in the quantity of comprehension [Intension].
(LL.I.221-2).
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In short, the notion of Involution takes us once again into the relativism of Hamil-
ton’s metaphysical epistemology and theory of language which he outlines more
extensively in his Lectures on Metaphysics.36 And, if he is, perhaps rather shakily,
attempting to give priority to the reality of Intension over and against the fac-
titiousness of Extension, he at least does so in a way that coheres interestingly
with his theory of language with regard to the iterative or relative or non-linear
origination of general and particular terms as a natural process of thought and
indeed reasoning. It must be noted, however, that Hamilton is here attempting
to foreground not the relativity of concepts but rather, that concepts considered
Intensively enable the natural tendencies in reasoning and thought generally ‘to
reason from the simple and general to the complex and individual [and also] re-
verse the process, and [. . . ] reason from the complex and individual to the simple
and the general’ — this, he clearly sees as a particular virtue of the Intensive
quantity, namely, that, as contradistinguished from the Extensive quantity, the
reversals in the direction of reasoning that we do in fact or naturally make, can
only legitimately be carried out with regard to the Intensive quantity.
Although the somewhat fuzzy logic of this notion of Involution within, or charac-
terising, the relation of the internal components of a given concept, or its Intension
(as contradistinguished from Subordination in Extension), is not handled as fully
as one might wish, it does seem that Hamilton is attempting to ground in an in-
determinate reality of chaos or confusion, concepts as originating in, wrested out
of, and partaking in a significant degree of relativism. However, I would claim
that, though fluxive, quasi-organic, and arguably suggesting an indivisible and
interminably iterative process, the involution relation that Hamilton seems to be
suggesting inheres within a concept’s Intension, warrants, or is itself peculiarly
suggestive of, the distinction of constituent parts comprising wholes and the de-
fensibility and inherent reasonableness of regarding such parts as being contained
in the whole such that their relations one to the other may be understood as nec-
essary and as such fundamental to Pure Logic as the science of the necessary laws
of thought. The naturalness of this reasoning as grounded in the notion that the
parts of parts involve and are involved, and thereby permit reversing the process of
reasoning, is brought out or hinted at by Hamilton in several ways. For example,
just what he seems to think of as Involution may be being suggested in what he
says about partes integrantes with regard to Mathematical, or the Quantitative, or
Integrant Whole (see LL.I.204). Perhaps the naturalness and primacy Hamilton
is trying to claim of Intension, as contrasted to the factitiousness of Extension,
is being indicated in the natural involutions of physical entities as we encounter
them in, say, the human body, but also as may be postulated of all material phe-
nomena as the relative, plural, and confused constituents of consciousness which,
conditioned by thought, we naturally or inevitably collect together (or grasp) as
resembling particulars. Organised into wholes, as part of the natural processes of
thought and our conditioning propensity to cognise, these wholes avail, and indeed
require, a corresponding analysis into their particulars and a relation of these to
36See, Lectures on Metaphysics, II.319-27.
132 Ralph Jessop
the concept they constitute, our act of grasping or even perceiving them as col-
lected together into the unity of the concept, being the synthetic reconstruction
of the particulars constituting it, albeit to some degree provisionally. For Hamil-
ton, it is as though a power of the mind — the faculty of comparison – is itself
reinforced by and originates in the involution relationship as something that at
once suggests the greater chaos or confused complexity into which the involutions
of the parts seem to be capable of collapsing, while also suggesting the sharper
discrimination into non-involved particulars that are thereby not constitutive of
but which rather divide a concept into its Extensive quantity. If so, Involution
at once suggests and is itself the suggestion of what a concept’s Intension may be
evolved into by the native processes of conception and its negative corollary, the
reasoning of an analysis only prevented from disintegrating into infinite divisibility
by an aptly pragmatic limitation on the extent of this science’s explicitness, which
Hamilton explicitly imposes (see LL.I.192-3; 210).
But in order to go at least some way towards understanding why Hamilton is
now claiming that the reasoning of Intension is natural, or has a basis in reality
— and indeed in a reality that he regards as otherwise confused or chaotic and
theoretically if not practically open to infinite divisibility in its unconditioned state
as the raw and unorganised mere phenomena of consciousness — and hence why
he regards Intension as prior or superior to the quantity of Extension, we need to
note at least something of the extent to which he regards the history of logic since
Aristotle as flawed. We also need to note that Hamilton quite pointedly regards his
prioritisation of Intension as a significant contribution towards placing the keystone
in the arch of the Aristotelian logic. He claims that logicians following Aristotle
rather surprisingly neglected the process of reasoning to do with Intension, even
though they explicitly stated and relied upon the axiom: ‘The character of the
character is the character of the thing; or, The predicate of the predicate is the
predicate of the subject’ (LL.I.218). However, according to Hamilton, Aristotle
understood the application of this axiom:
In fact I think it even possible to show in detail, that his whole analysis
of the syllogism has reference to both quantities, and that the great
abstruseness of his Prior Analytics, the treatise in which he develops
the general forms of reasoning, arises from this,–that he has endeav-
oured to rise to formulæ sufficiently general to express at once what
was common to both kinds;–an attempt so far beyond the intelligence
of subsequent logicians, that they have wholly misunderstood and per-
verted his doctrine. They understood this doctrine, only as applied to
the reasoning in extensive quantity; and in relation to this kind of rea-
soning, they have certainly made palpable and easy what in Aristotle
is abstract and difficult. But then they did not observe that Aristotle’s
doctrine applies to two species, of which they only consider one. [. . . ].
This mistake,–this partial conception of the science,–is common to all
logicians, ancient and modern: for in so far as I am aware, no one has
observed, that of the quantities of comprehension and extension, each
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affords a reasoning proper to itself; and no one has noticed that the
doctrine of Aristotle has reference indifferently to both. (LL.I.218-9).
3 DOCTRINE OF JUDGMENTS
In the proposition Men are animals, we should be allowed to determine
whether the term men means all or some men,–whether the term ani-
mals means all or some animals; in short, to quantify both the subject
and predicate of the proposition. This postulate [‘To state explicitly
what is thought implicitly’] applies both to Propositions and to Syllo-
gisms. (NA.LL.II.252)
In elucidating some aspects of Hamilton’s ‘Schemes of the Two Quantities’ table
and certain features of his doctrine of Concepts in the previous section, I have
so far been indicating something of how his development and understanding of
Extension and Intension underpinned his quantification of the predicate. Before
examining the quantification itself, we need to look at a selection of some of the
other construction work.
By ‘judgment’ Hamilton means ‘proposition’ or the forming of a proposition,
such as ‘water rusts iron’, by means of the process of judging (LL.I.227). What
is relative within a judgment or proposition has at least the appearance of being
much more stable than the relativity of concepts discussed at various stages above,
though the very fact that Hamilton calls attention to propositions as judgments,
keeps in focus how it is that a proposition may be regarded as at least related
to some mental agency, a judgment being the product of the act of judging (akin
to a concept being the product of conception). Introducing his students to the
standard terms of ‘subject’, ‘predicate’, and ‘copula’, he points out that the subject
is the determined or qualified notion, whereas the predicate is the determining or
qualifying notion, the relation of determination between them being signified by
the copula. He therefore defines a proposition as:
the product of that act in which we pronounce, that, of two notions
thought as subject and as predicate, the one does or does not constitute
a part of the other, either in the quantity of Extension, or in the
quantity of Comprehension. (LL.I.229).
Hamilton is clearly regarding subject and predicate as being held in a relation
of quantity in accordance with the axiom that a part of a part is a part of the
whole, but he is also, consistent with his treatment of Extension and Intension,
incorporating both of these quantities, and this is how he does so:
The first great distinction of Judgments is taken from the relation of
Subject and Predicate, as reciprocally whole and part. If the Subject
or determined notion be viewed as the containing whole, we have an
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Intensive or Comprehensive proposition; if the Predicate or determin-
ing notion be viewed as the containing whole, we have an Extensive
proposition. (LL.I.231-2).
Hence, whether a proposition is Extensive or Intensive depends on how we view
the Subject and the Predicate. Of course Hamilton acknowledges that in single
propositions it is rarely clear which way the proposition is to be viewed, since
it is generally unclear whether it is the Subject or the Predicate that is being
regarded as the containing whole. However, according to Hamilton, ‘It is only
when propositions are connected together into syllogism, that it becomes evident
whether the subject or the predicate be the whole in or under which the other is
contained’ — he thus regards the distinction of propositions into Extensive and
Intensive as highly general, though of great importance, since ‘it is only in subor-
dination to this distinction that the other distinctions [he is about to introduce]
are valid’ (LL.I.233). The other distinctions that relate to the Extensive/Intensive
distinction with regard to the subject and predicate relation may be summed up
as: the distinction between Categorical (or simple propositions, in which, follow-
ing the practice of Aristotle’s followers, the predicate is either simply affirmed or
denied of the subject, as in ‘A is B’, or ‘A is not B’) and Conditional proposi-
tions, Conditional propositions being further distinguished into Hypothetical (‘if
A then B’), Disjunctive (‘A or B’, or ‘D is either B, or C, or A’), and Dilemmatic
or Hypothetico-disjunctive (‘If X is A, it is either B or C’) (see LL.I.233-242).
Although it is crucial to grasp that Hamilton is showing his students how in prin-
ciple the subject and predicate terms may be viewed as reciprocally related to one
another in any given proposition as expressions solely concerned with a whole-
part relationship, either in Extension or Intension, it is needless to elucidate this
any further here. More importantly, is Hamilton’s major point of difference with
Aristotle and ‘The doctrine of Logicians’ concerning the division of propositions
into four classes or species, since it is in this that Hamilton may be said to be
making his most explicit statement within his Lectures so far, concerning how his
system and much if not all of his previous discourse on logic has been working
towards and in turn will rely upon a thoroughgoing quantification of the predi-
cate, a quantification which notably traditional logic had failed to achieve due, not
only to exclusively focusing on Extension, but also to the establishment of a class
of proposition that admitted vagueness or ambiguity with regard to the subject
term’s quantification and thereby disabled quantification by failing to make ex-
plicit the quantity pertaining to the subject term which, according to Hamilton, is
‘involved in every actual thought’ though at times not in its linguistic expression
(LL.I.244). But, as we shall see, for Hamilton, as this notion that quantity is
either explicit or implicit enables the removal of a class of propositions in which
the subject term is not quantified in expression, it also underpins the whole notion
that the predicate term’s quantity may also be made explicit.
Following Aristotle, logicians traditionally divided propositions with regard to
their Extensive quantity by categorising them as: Universal or General ; Partic-
ular ; Individual or Singular ; and, Indefinite. According to Hamilton these terms
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were applied with the following meanings: in Universal propositions ‘the subject
is taken in its whole extension’; in Particular propositions ‘the subject is taken
in a part, indefinitely, of its extension’; in Individual propositions ‘the subject is
at a minimum of extension’; and in Indefinite propositions, ‘the subject is not
[. . . ] overtly declared to be either universal, particular, or individual’ (LL.I.243).
With regard to quantification generally, Hamilton claims that commonly only the
Subject is regulated, whereas the predicate ‘Aristotle and the logicians do not
allow to be affected by quantity; at least they hold it to be always Particular in
an Affirmative, and Universal in a Negative’ (LL.I.244). However, he claims that
this doctrine is untenable, incomplete, that it resulted in confusion, and that this
confusion and incompleteness is partly due to logicians paying insufficient heed to
the fundamental postulate of explicitness that I explained earlier. At this stage in
his lectures, Hamilton might have simply gone straight to quantifying the pred-
icate to show that, by making the quantification of the predicate term explicit,
it is no longer requisite that we consider whether the proposition is being con-
sidered extensively or intensively. However, he is much more careful to take his
students through the evolution of his logic as it involves a critique and a signifi-
cant modification of traditional logic’s assumption that the predicate term in an
affirmative proposition is always Particular whereas in a negative proposition it is
always Universal.
By contrast with the Aristotelian doctrine of the logicians, which divides propo-
sitions into the four classes or species of Universal, Particular, Individual, and
Indefinite, Hamilton proposes that they should be differentiated quite differently,
and he does this largely by redefining ‘indefinite’ and thereby eradicating as a
distinct class traditional logic’s Indefinite propositions, while retaining the notion
of indefiniteness as describing, within any given whole, an indeterminate range
of quantities sufficiently competent to be classed as the quantifier of particularity
we normally express by the term ‘some’ — in other words Hamilton’s ‘indefinite’
constitutes that species of judgments/propositions the logicians formerly called
‘Particular’.
His redefinition of ‘indefinite’ seems to amount to this: for the logicians ‘indefi-
nite’ meant little more than that the Extensive quantity of the subject (universal,
particular, or individual) was unexpressed and thus indefinite in the sense of being
unclear or inexplicit; by contrast with this, for Hamilton, ‘indefinite’ refers more
directly to the quantity expressed by the terms ‘some’, ‘many’, and various other
expressions so long as they designate ‘some indefinite number less than the whole’.
Hence, his definition of ‘indefinite’ refers to any quantity within a whole, ranging
from (possibly) a singular to a number less than the whole to which the indefinite
term refers (LL.I.246). It should perhaps be noted here that Hamilton’s definition
of ‘indefinite’ may not at first sight seem to differentiate itself sufficiently from
the quantity of Individual judgments or propositions, nor from Universal propo-
sitions. As Fogelin claims, Hamilton ‘held complicated views on the quantifier
some’, in which, while he sometimes referred to ‘some’ as meaning ‘some but not
all’, he also used the definition ‘some perhaps all’, and as Fogelin argues, there
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seem to be good grounds for saying that Hamilton purposely incorporates both
readings of ‘some’ (Fogelin, 153).37 These complicated views on the meaning of
Particulars, as that class of propositions which are indefinite, only come to the
fore in Hamilton’s ‘New Analytic’ (see NA.LL.II.279-80). However, that by ‘some’
Hamilton meant ‘some but not all’, and that he distinguishes between Individual
and Particular Propositions does seem to be fairly clear if we confine attention
solely to Lecture XIII. Not only does he give little or no indication in Lecture
XIII that ‘some’ might mean ‘some perhaps all’, but he also makes it very clear
that a proposition may be expressed using the indefinite article, and thereby be
classed as a Particular proposition, as in one of his examples, ‘An Englishman gen-
eralised the law of gravitation’; whereas, when expressed using a proper name, it
will be an Individual proposition, as in ‘Newton generalised the law of gravitation’
(LL.I.247). This, however, merely illustrates what is required to transform an
ordinary language statement from being a Particular proposition to an Individual
one and Hamilton’s explicitness principle ought to allow that all such indefinite
propositions, not involving a plurality, must be expressible as individual or, where
the ‘some’ really means ‘all’, as universal propositions. Though Hamilton may not
have squarely tackled certain problems to do with his definition of the quantifier
‘some’, it is at least possible to detect in his virtual eradication of the traditional
logic’s class of Indefinite propositions, that he is making the treatment of the
quantity of propositions more internally consistent by accommodating the indef-
inite within Particular propositions by removing the obstruction to them being
accommodated within Particular propositions, namely, the mistaken condition of
their failure to express whether they were universal, particular, or individual — a
failure that, Hamilton might have pointed out, was entirely due to the logicians not
grasping that, in an Extensive proposition, where the quantity of the subject is un-
expressed it must either be a part (and hence particular) of the predicate as whole;
or, in an Intensive proposition, its quantity must be capable of being expressed
as the containing whole determined by the predicate as part of that whole. To
re-state the quotation given earlier: ‘If the Subject or determined notion be viewed
as the containing whole, we have an Intensive or Comprehensive proposition; if
the Predicate or determining notion be viewed as the containing whole, we have
an Extensive proposition’ (LL.I.231-2). By itself this will not imply what quantity
ought to be appended to the subject of a given proposition where that quantity
remains unknown. However, this is irrelevant as the traditional class of Indefinite
propositions regards the proposition in Extension alone, and as I have claimed in
support of Hamilton, viewing the traditional Indefinite proposition as Extensive,
determines that the subject term must be particular in relation to the predicate
term as the determining whole containing the subject term. What Hamilton has
37Robert J. Fogelin, ‘Hamilton’s Quantification of the Predicate’ in, Philosophical Interpre-
tations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), first published in Philosophical Quarterly, 26
(1976), 149-65. All references to Fogelin are to this edition. Fogelin also supplies in this edition a
second article entitled ‘Hamilton’s Theory of Quantifying the Predicate — A Correction’ (166-8),
also first published in Philosophical Quarterly, 26.
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achieved here is the removal of an anomalous class of propositions that is only
possible by means of his understanding of the whole-part relationship in proposi-
tions viewed Extensively and Intensively. However, although much more might be
said about all this, there is another crucial factor to removing the traditional class
of problematic and confusing indefinite or indeterminate propositions, namely, his
introduction of the terms ‘predesignate’ and ‘preindesignate’.
It is easy to see how the application of these terms to the traditional class of
Indefinite propositions warrants a discrimination between propositions that may
thereby be deemed to be either logically adequate or inadequate. When a propo-
sition (presumably considered as an external expression that may thus be more or
less precise, as contradistinguished from a judgment, construed here as the mental
process) articulates its quantity by prefixing terms such as ‘all’ and ‘some’, this
is a predesignate proposition; whereas when a proposition does not articulate its
quantity, the proposition is called by Hamilton, preindesignate. Hence, the subject
and predicate terms of a proposition may also be either predesignate or preindes-
ignate terms. But, for Hamilton, though in a proposition’s external expression
one or both of its terms may be preindesignate (the quantity often being ‘elided in
its expression’), the unexpressed quantity is always involved in thought (definite
or indefinite ‘quantity being involved in every actual thought’, though not always
marked by a quantifier) (NA.LL.II.250; LL.I.244). Hence, adhering to his princi-
ple of explicitness, such preindesignate terms may be translated into predesignate
ones — which is to say, that unexpressed quantities may always be expressed at
least in principle and indeed should be expressed in adherence to the fundamental
principle of explicitness. One might therefore say that, with regard to the tradi-
tional class of Indefinite propositions, if in fact it is impossible to determine the
predesignate term(s) (as quantified in thought) of a given statement purporting
to be a proposition but which is somehow quite indeterminate in its meaning by
means of its use of a preindesignate term(s) (hence unquantified in expression),
then such a statement must be deemed to be non-propositional and inadequate
for consideration within a reasoning or argument.
The differences between propositions, with regard to quantity, according to
Hamilton, arise, on the one hand, ‘from the necessary condition of the Internal
Thought’ (when we consider them specifically as Judgments), and on the other
hand, ‘merely from the accidental circumstances of [a proposition’s] External Ex-
pression’ (when we consider them as propositions) (LL.I.243). Thus, he charac-
terises three classes of proposition as properly adequate for logical consideration:
Universal judgments or propositions, ‘in which the whole number of objects within
a sphere or class are judged of,–as All men are mortal, or Every man is mortal’ ;
Individual judgments or propositions, in which ‘the whole of a certain sphere is
judged of, but in which sphere there is found only a single object, or collection
of single objects,–as Catiline is ambitious,–The twelve apostles were inspired’, the
individual(s) in question here constituting what Hamilton describes, with possible
oblique reference to his notion of involution, ‘determinate wholeness or totality
in the form of oneness [or] indivisible unity’; and, Particular judgments or propo-
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sitions, ‘in which, among the objects within a certain sphere or class, we judge
concerning some indefinite number less than the whole,–as Some men are virtu-
ous–Many boys are courageous–Most women are compassionate. The indefinite
plurality, within the totality, being here denoted by the words some, many, most ’
(LL.I.245-6). As he explains by means of reference to the example cited above
concerning the conversion of a Particular proposition (‘An Englishman . . . ’) into
an Individual proposition (‘Newton . . . ’), although the logicians are right to treat
Universals and Individuals as convertible, their correspondence one with the other
is not merely due to ‘the oneness of their subject’, but rather: ‘The whole distinc-
tion consists in this,–that, in Universals and in Individual Judgments, the num-
ber of the objects judged of is thought by us as definite; whereas, in Particular
Judgments, the number of such objects is thought by us as indefinite’ (LL.I.246).
Hence, the major distinction between propositions in terms of quantity is between
the definite (universal or individual) and the indefinite (particular). This distinc-
tion between definite and indefinite quantity, Hamilton declares most forcefully in
his ‘New Analytic’: ‘definite and indefinite are the only quantities of which we
ought to hear in Logic; for it is only as indefinite that particular, it is only as
definite that individual and general, quantities have any (and the same) logical
avail’ (NA.LL.II.250).
Thus, bearing in mind that, since Universals and Individuals with regard to
quantity, constitute one class of definite propositions, whereas Particulars consti-
tute the only alternative quantity and thus class of indefinite propositions, all that
needs to be added to this twofold definite (Universal and Individual) and indefinite
(Particular) distinction between propositional forms to yield the traditional (yet
Hamiltonized) fourfold distinction, is the standard distinction between affirmation
and negation, known as the quality of the proposition. Hamilton briefly outlines
the notion of quality, which he regards as an unfortunately ambiguous and yet gen-
erally accepted term to denote affirmation and negation (LL.I.250). Important to
his quantification of the predicate, he sensibly argues against some contemporary
and earlier logicians who held that affirmation and negation properly belong to
the copula and not to the subject nor to the predicate terms. Drawing attention to
the non-literal or non-grammatical sense in which the copula should be regarded
as expressing the form of the relation between subject and predicate, he argues
against certain previous and some modern logicians, that negation does not belong
to the predicate term but rather to the copula, allowing him to treat subject and
predicate as being held together in a reciprocal relation of whole to part, such that
in a negative judgment a part is taken out of a whole, whereas in an affirmative
judgment a part is put into a whole (see LL.I.251-4). All that thus belongs to the
subject and to the predicate, for Hamilton, is their respective definite (Universal or
Individual) or indefinite (Particular) quantities; but as this enables a distinction
between propositional forms according to their quantity (definite or indefinite),
traditionally given as Universal or Particular, when these are both distinguished
according to their quality (affirmative or negative), this results in the traditional
fourfold A,E, I,O distinction of propositional forms: A (universal affirmative); E
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(universal negative); I (particular affirmative); O (particular negative).
He represents the forms A,E, I,O by using simple circle diagrams (see LL.I.255).
I shall not provide these since they merely illustrate the quantity and quality as-
pects of the four propositional forms and since I shall shortly provide one of Hamil-
ton’s later tables from the ‘New Analytic’ which, by deleting one of the diagrams
as redundant and adding one that expresses co-extension, incorporates these circle
diagrams into a new set of four figures to which he relates both the traditional
forms A,E, I,O, and his additional forms. Although it is highly likely that Hamil-
ton pointed out to his students the quantifications of the predicate and the subject
terms implied by the diagrams, for example, that the Universal Affirmative (A)
in traditional logic implied an indefinite or Particular predicate, the text does
not at this stage make any explicit reference either to the assumptions concerning
quantification nor does it advance the thoroughgoing quantification that results in
Hamilton doubling the traditional four propositional forms A,E, I,O. It must be
noted, however, that much later in the Lectures he does assert that ‘The nineteen
useful [syllogistic] moods admitted by logicians, may [. . . ] by the quantification of
the predicate, be still further simplified, by superseding the significance of Figure’
(LL.I.402). Although his quantification of the predicate does not seem to have
been made fully explicit, he was clearly at the very least intimating aspects of it
to his students some years before his controversy with de Morgan.
Lecture XIV is the last lecture on Hamilton’s doctrine of Judgments. Before he
terminates the lecture, he makes at least one significant claim worth mentioning,
namely, his rejection of Modal propositions as a separate class and his argument
that, for example, the modal proposition ‘Alexander conquered Darius honourably ’
ought to be treated as merely a complex proposition in which the mode is regarded
as part of the predicate. As Hamilton points out the predicate can be more or
less complex and there is no need for the Aristotelian logic’s modal propositions
as ‘modified by the four attributions of Necessity, Impossibility, Contingence, and
Possibility. [. . . ] in regard to these, the case is precisely the same; the mode is
merely a part of the predicate, and if so, nothing can be more unwarranted than on
this accidental, on this extra-logical, circumstance to establish a great division of
logical propositions’ (LL.I.257). Once again Whately comes under fire concerning
this, as also when Hamilton moves on to discuss and outline some basic points
concerning the subject of the conversion of judgments or propositions, such as
when the subject and predicate are transposed in a categorical proposition (see
LL.I.258–9; 262–3). I shall come back to the subject of conversion briefly later,
but for the time being I shall leave Hamilton’s lectures and the commencement of
his introduction to reasoning and the syllogism, and instead leap forward to his
later work in the fragmentary but nonetheless insightful and more mature work, his
‘New Analytic of Logical Forms’. For, within Lecture XIV Hamilton has arrived at
a significant stage in laying the groundwork for his quantification of the predicate.
Although by this stage he has yet much more to construct, it would seem that he
has reached a critical point that has by now established a warrant for providing
the thoroughgoing quantification that I shall illustrate in the following section.
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4 QUANTIFICATION OF THE PREDICATE
THIS NEW Analytic is intended to complete and simplify the old —
to place the keystone in the Aristotelic Arch. (NA.LL.II.249)
It is abundantly clear in the ‘New Analytic’ that Hamilton’s principle of explic-
itness, or rather the thoroughness of his adherence to this principle, is a major
driving force behind his quantification of the predicate. He cites the postulate
or principle as something insisted upon by Logic, but insufficiently adhered to by
previous logicians, claiming on the basis of this principle, ‘that, logically, we ought
to take into account the quantity, always understood in thought, but usually, and
for manifest reasons, elided in its expression, not only of the subject, but also of
the predicate, of a judgment’ (NA.LL.II.250; and see p. 252). Making explicit
the quantities of both the subject and the predicate in a judgment or proposition
facilitates regarding the subject and predicate terms as comprising ‘an equation’.
It is important to understand how it can be said that the whole-part relationship
in Extension or Intension may be thought of as constituting either an equation or
non-equation. Though in some places Hamilton does not seem to be as clear as
he might have been on this point, at other places his explanation is substantially
more helpful than the often rather submerged hints in the Lectures. For example,
in the ‘New Analytic’ Hamilton’s treatment of the subject of the Conversion of
Categorical propositions clarifies what he thinks erroneous in traditional logic’s
Conversion of propositions with regard to quantity.
He regards the doctrine of Conversion as ‘beset with errors’ but that these errors
are generated from two principal ones — Hamilton is worth quoting at length here:
The First cardinal error is,–That the quantities are not converted with
the quantified terms. For the real terms compared in the Convertend
[the original proposition], and which, of course, ought to reappear with-
out change, except of place, in the Converse [the proposition converted],
are not the naked, but the quantified terms. This is evident from the
following considerations:
1o, The Terms of a Proposition are only terms as they are terms of
relation; and the relation here is the relation of comparison.
2o, As the Propositional Terms are terms of comparison, so they are
only compared as Quantities,–quantities relative to each other. An
Affirmative Proposition is simply the declaration of an equation, a
Negative Proposition is simply the declaration of a non-equation, of its
terms. To change, therefore, the quantity of either, or of both Subject
and Predicate, is to change their correlation,–the point of comparison;
and to exchange their quantities, if different, would be to invert the
terminal interdependence, that is, to make the less the greater, and
the greater the less.
3o, The Quantity of the Proposition in Conversion remains always the
same; that is, the absolute quantity of the Converse must be exactly
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equal to that of the Convertend. It was only from overlooking the
quantity of the predicate [. . . ] that two propositions, exactly equal
in quantity, in fact the same proposition, perhaps, transposed, were
called the one universal, the other particular, by exclusive reference to
the quantity of the subject.
4o, Yet was it of no consequence, in a logical point of view, which of
the notions collated were Subject or Predicate; and their comparison,
with the consequent declaration of their mutual inclusion or exclu-
sion, that is, of affirmation or negation, of no more real difference than
the assertions,–London is four hundred miles distant from Edinburgh,–
Edinburgh is four hundred miles distant from London. In fact, though
logicians have been in use to place the subject first, the predicate last,
in their examples of propositions, this is by no means the case in ordi-
nary language, where, indeed, it is frequently even difficult to ascertain
which is the determining and which the determined notion. [. . . .]
The Second cardinal error of the logicians is, the not considering that
the Predicate has always a quantity in thought, as much as the Sub-
ject; although this quantity be frequently not explicitly enounced, as
unnecessary in the common employment of language; for the deter-
mining notion or predicate being always thought as at least adequate
to, or co-extensive with , the subject or determined notion, it is sel-
dom necessary to express this, and language tends ever to elide what
may safely be omitted. But this necessity recurs, the moment that, by
conversion, the predicate becomes the subject of the proposition; and
to omit its formal statement is to degrade Logic from the science of
the necessities of thought, to an idle subsidiary of the ambiguities of
speech. [. . . .]
1o, That the predicate is as extensive as the subject is easily shown.
Take the proposition,–All animal is man, or, All animals are men. This
we are conscious is absurd, though we make the notion man or men as
wide as possible; for it does not mend the matter to say,–All animal is
all man, or, All animals are all men. We feel it to be equally absurd as
if we said,–All man is all animal, or, All men are all animals. Here we
are aware that the subject and predicate cannot be made coextensive.
If we would get rid of the absurdity, we must bring the two notions
into coextension, by restricting the wider. If we say,–Man is animal,
(Homo est animal), we think, though we do not overtly enounce it, All
man is animal. And what do we mean here by animal? We do not
think,–All, but Some, animal. And then we can make this indifferently
either subject or predicate. We can think,–we can say, Some animal is
man, that is, Some or All Man; and, e converso,–Man (some of all) is
animal, viz. some animal.
It thus appears that there is a necessity in all cases for thinking the
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predicate, at least, as extensive as the subject. Whether it be ab-
solutely, that is, out of relation, more extensive, is generally of no
consequence; and hence the common reticence of common language,
which never expresses more than can be understood — which always,
in fact, for the sake of brevity, strains at ellipsis. (NA.LL.II.257-9)
This lengthy quotation brings several things to our attention: that Hamilton re-
gards the quantifying terms as integrant components of the ‘naked’ terms or con-
cepts or judgments used in any given proposition — and hence whenever the
‘naked’ terms are transposed in some conversion, their clothing (the quantifier)
goes with them; the terms of a proposition only exist qua terms as related to one
another by a comparison of their respective quantities, and that their quantities
will be identical or equated in an affirmative proposition, non-identical or not
equated, but rather related by some confliction to do with their quantities, in a
negative proposition — violation of this relation of comparison or equation/non-
equation is to change without warrant the relation being asserted in their very
predication; that it is mistaken to deem a proposition to be Universal or Par-
ticular solely by attending to the status of the quantification of its subject; and,
Hamilton’s reliance on his principle or postulate of explicitness as the fundamental
principle of Logic is invoked as warranting exposure of what must (on pain of oth-
erwise thinking an absurdity) be thought with regard to the predicate’s quantity
and thereby its relation of equation or non-equation with the quantified subject.
This last point concerning how in thought if not in linguistic expression (due to
our propensity in linguistic expression to elide quantities into the ‘naked’ terms)
strongly suggests a mental and in this sense private language of subject-predicate
equation/non-equation, a mental relation of the respective quantities of both sub-
ject and predicate, that is often but not always behind the scenes and tantamount
to the fundamental necessary laws of logic themselves. However, Hamilton seems
to be at pains to describe these laws as in some sense natural, informing actual
discourse, and in turn operating as the standard against which rhetorical utter-
ance may be tested and to which rhetoric may be reduced without attempting to
modify logic’s laws to suit grammar: ‘We should not do as the logicians have been
wont,–introduce and deal with [‘the rhetorical enouncements of common speech’]
in their grammatical integrity; for this would be to swell out and deform our sci-
ence with mere grammatical accidents; and to such fortuitous accrescences the
formidable volume, especially of the older Logics, is mainly owing. In fact, a large
proportion of the scholastic system is merely grammatical’ (NA.LL.II.262). The
tendency in Hamilton’s logic to correct and simplify traditional logic, thus marks
a major departure from regarding logic as an attempt to capture the vagaries and
complexities of grammatical rules, real-life argumentation, and rhetoric in order
to keep logic focused on the laws of necessary inference. However, although this
approach warrants the unnatural sounding expressions that result from quantify-
ing the predicate, as in ‘All men are some mortal’, Hamilton is not such a purist as
to eschew utterly the notion of Pure Logic’s relevance to and capacity to translate
‘the rhetorical enouncements of common speech’, nor is his quantification of the
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predicate justified solely by means of reference to a merely dogmatic assertion that
quantity is ‘always understood in thought’ though often elided in its linguistic ex-
pression, since his arguments in support of quantifying the predicate incorporate
appeals to common instances in which the quantification is made explicit: ‘in fact,
ordinary language quantifies the Predicate so often as this determination becomes
of the smallest import’ (NA.LL.II.259).
Be all that as it may, it becomes clear in the ‘New Analytic’ that one of Hamil-
ton’s major achievements with regard to the complex and, as he often asserts,
confusing doctrines, rules, and practices of the logicians has to do with how his
system effectually sweeps away various different types of conversion. With the
establishment of his quantification of the predicate the only defensible type of
conversion is the simple conversion he advocates. His simple conversion relies
wholly upon the predicate’s quantification being made as explicit as the quan-
tification of the original subject term. Hence, simple conversion merely involves
whatever transposition of terms is possible so long as the respective quantifiers of
the original subject and predicate terms remain attached to these terms in order
to retain in conversion any given proposition’s meaning as an equation or non-
equation of the quantities of the two terms in the original proposition. Over and
again Hamilton emphasises the erroneousness of earlier species of conversion, both
with regard to affirmative and negative propositions (see NA.LL.II.256-76). The
logicians had missed ‘the one straight road’ of conversion, simple conversion, and
Hamilton makes the ambitious but clearly defensible claim that if, by means of
his quantification of the predicate, he is right in having reduced all species of con-
version to the simple conversion he advocates, then ‘the whole doctrine of logical
Conversion is superseded as operose and imperfect, as useless and erroneous. The
systems, new and old, must stand or fall with their doctrines of the Conversion of
propositions’ (NA.LL.II.276).
Though some elements of Hamilton’s construction of his system of quantifying
the predicate have been overlooked above, I think I have given an ample outline of
his notions concerning the quantification and how this radically supersedes much
of the traditional logic while yet incorporating and building upon at least some
part of it. However, we now need to look at Hamilton’s quantification procedure
in some more detail and the best place to commence this is by examining the table
supplied at Appendix V section (d) in the second volume of his Lectures on Logic,
which, with only a few minor adjustments, I have replicated below as Table 2:
The only significant modification I have made to Hamilton’s table as given at
Table 2 above, is to adopt his later method of symbolising the Universal and
Particular terms using the letters A for Universal, and I for Particular (enclosed in
square brackets). This alteration should also be of some help to readers who may
wish to make comparisons between Table 2 and Hamilton’s more detailed ‘Table
of the Mutual Relations of the Eight Propositional Forms on Either System of
Particularity’ to which I shall refer later (see NA.LL.II.284).
Table 2 is interesting in several ways. Firstly, the various configurations of A
(universal/definite) and I (particular/indefinite) under Affirmative and Negative
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Table 2. Application of Doctrine of Quantified Predicate to Propositions
New Propositional Forms — Notation
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regularly display all of the possible permutations of a thorough quantification of
both subject and predicate as neatly displayed in the symbols given in square
brackets such as [A f A]. Secondly, the arrow lines indicate which of the terms is
the subject and which the predicate, depending on whether the proposition is to
be read as Extensive or Intensive — hence, the terms may be easily transposed
according to Hamilton’s method of simple conversion without any alteration in
the proposition’s meaning using the same symbolic notation for both an Extensive
and an Intensive reading (though it must be said that by this stage in Hamil-
ton’s logic, having made so much of Extension and Intension to establish the dual
perspectives from which propositions may be viewed, how thus the subject and
predicate terms may be transposed, and how the number of syllogistic forms can
thereby be amplified, the Extension-Intension distinction seems to fall out of ac-
count as superseded by the full quantification itself). Thirdly, using Hamilton’s
own terminology and categorisation, the four circle diagrams need to be thought
of as expressing not four but three possible principal relations of: Toto-total Coin-
clusion (fig. 1); Toto-total Coexclusion (fig. 3); and, brought together under one
class of counter-related relations, Incomplete Coinclusion and Coexclusion (fig. 2
and 4). Fourthly, Hamilton’s example of proposition (1) uses the symbol ‘Γ’, but
since it only appears in this proposition, it is not immediately clear which of the
other propositions may be said to be its contradictory or negation, though with a
simple change of terms proposition (v), describing the relation of Toto-total Co-
exclusion (fig. 3), seems to be the most obvious contradictory of proposition (1)
as describing Toto-total Coinclusion (fig. 1). These last two points require further
explanation and as we shall see this will involve some discussion of a major source
of difficulty and controversy concerning Hamilton’s quantification.
Firstly, my third point above: in Hamilton’s system the relationship between
subject and predicate in each proposition needs to be thought of as a relationship
of mutuality. This becomes much more clear when we take note of Hamilton’s
‘Observations on the Mutual Relation of Syllogistic Terms in Quantity and Quality’
at Appendix V (e) in the Lectures on Logic (see NA.LL.II.285). With reference to
the circle diagrams in Table 2 above, these relations can be given as follows:
1. Toto-total Coinclusion (fig. 1) — the relation of ‘coidentity, ab-
solute convertibility or reciprocation’.
2. Toto-total Coexclusion (fig. 3) — the relation of ‘non-identity,
absolute inconvertibility or non-reciprocation)
3. Incomplete Coinclusion and its counter-relation Incomplete Coex-
clusion (fig. 2 and fig.4) — the relations of ‘partial identity and
non-identity, relative convertibility and non-convertibility, recip-
rocation and non-reciprocation’. Under this counter-related pair
of Incomplete Coinclusion and Coexclusion, Hamilton details all
of the propositional forms he regards as intermediaries between
the extreme opposites of proposition (1) Toto-total Coinclusion,
and proposition (v) Toto-total Coexclusion as:
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(ii) Toto-partial coinclusion (fig. 2)
(3) Parti-total coinclusion (fig. 2)
(iv) Parti-partial coinclusion (fig. 4)
(6) Toto-partial coexclusion (fig. 4)
(vii) Parti-total coexclusion (fig. 4)
(8) Parti-partial coexclusion (fig. 4)
(see NA.LL.II.285)
Though these relations and how the eight propositional forms may be said to
relate to one another deserve further explanation, I shall instead draw attention
to two main points here. Firstly, as Hamilton argues in his Lectures, in keeping
with traditional logic a universal (A or E) may be treated as an individual or
as a universal proposition — hence, the Toto-total Coinclusion and Coexclusion
relations represented in Table 2’s proposition (1) [fig. 1], and proposition (v)
[fig. 3] respectively, may be translated in two ways as referring either to: two
single/individual entities (A and B) that are (1) identical or (v) non-identical; or,
two groups (collections) of things, all of which in each collection (A and B) are
sufficiently resembling to be asserted as (1) identical or (v) non-identical — hence
Fogelin seems to be right to claim that ‘Hamilton develops his theory of universal
propositions on an existential (rather than a Boolean) interpretation)’, though
arguably, as seems to be the case with his specific illustrations of propositions
(1) and (v), he does also accommodate a priori truths constituted by wholes
that may be thought of as having no existential import as physical realities, the
whole and thus individual that is ‘All Triangle’ existing in thought, though its
ontological status, as a purely ideal whole, is by no means unrelated to the whole
that might be any more or less complete collection of real triangles as instantiations
of the unity of thought that is ‘All Triangle’ (see Fogelin, p. 152). Incidentally,
the complex and interesting topic of Hamilton’s understanding of the existential
import of propositions, which I have merely touched on here, is not perhaps as
one at might first think, since Hamilton is conscious that ‘the Logician has a right
to suppose any material impossibility, any material falsity; he takes no account of
what is objectively impossible or false, and has a right to assume what premises
he please, provided they do not involve a contradiction in terms’ (LL.I.322; also
see, p. 338; p. 360).
The second main point I want to make here is that, though in his Lectures
Hamilton seems to keep to just one sense of the quantifier ‘some’ it becomes
clear in the ‘New Analytic’ that particulars, though in each and every case an
indefinite quantity, may be indefinite in two different senses, either: as Indefinite
Definitude, in the sense expressed by ‘some, at least’ (which is to say, ‘at least
one, possibly more, but not all’); or, as Definite Indefinitude, in the sense of ‘some,
at most’ (which is to say, ‘some, perhaps all, but not less than one’) — hence,
the Incomplete Coinclusion and Coexclusion relations represented in Table 2’s fig.
2 and fig. 4, may also be translated in two different ways to accommodate this
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difference in the possible senses of the Particular quantifier ‘some’. The significance
of these points should become clear later, but in the meantime, I want to claim that
while Hamilton made a great deal of the importance of Logic as a Pure science
that must not become intermixed with any grammatical, linguistic, rhetorical,
or other material concern (inasmuch as this is practically possible), as Fogelin
rightly points out, ‘Hamilton acknowledges both interpretations of the quantifier
some, but only insists that each interpretation must be examined in order to
capture all the everyday inference patterns a logician should study’ (see Fogelin,
p. 153). It does seem as though Hamilton is attempting to make his system
sufficiently accommodating, such that it can encompass different readings of ‘some’
(or can embrace different degrees of indefiniteness), and such that his system
can also be applied, not simply to both individual and universal quantities (as
the only definite quantities), but also, on the one hand: to a priori truths or
universals, the wholeness of which is as an unanalysable individual/singular, their
ontological status being ideal and thus potentially existing only in thought, though
actually never out of relation to, real entities; and, on the other hand and more
conspicuously, his system can be applied to those universals that we might better
describe as general terms, the a posteriori nature of which implies that at best
they are only approximate or provisional universals which may admit of some
exceptions without nevertheless losing their applicability in a syllogistic reasoning
as universal terms.
Now, to come to the second main observation I want to make about Table 2 (my
fourth point above): Hamilton’s proposition (1) is diagrammatically represented
by figure 1 in Table 2 and figures 2, 3, and 4 all look as though they illustrate rela-
tions that must stand counter to proposition (1), but since the example Hamilton
gives uses a term ‘Γ’ that he does not replicate elsewhere in Table 2, it is not im-
mediately clear which of the other propositions may be said to be its contradictory
or negation. Figure 1 absolutely equates C with Γ and thus describes an absolute
identity or Toto-total coinclusion relation between C and Γ. This is also illustrated
by Hamilton’s example of a possible proposition that might express this relation
between the judgments or concepts C and Γ: ‘All Triangle is all Trilateral’. How-
ever, surely both C and Γ collect together respectively the entire class of C (all
possible shapes and sizes of triangles) and Γ (all possible Trilateral figures) and,
linked by the copula, the proposition ‘All C is all Γ’ brings these two quantities
into a relation of comparison? If so, does this mean that de Morgan’s interpre-
tation of proposition (1) is right, namely, that it expresses a complex proposition
constructed by compounding ‘every C is Γ’ and ‘every Γ is C’ (de Morgan, p.
257)?
In Fogelin’s first attempt to express the meaning of Hamilton’s proposition
(1), he accepts de Morgan’s interpretation and (though shown using A and B
as terms) Fogelin thus translates proposition (1) as ‘All C is Γ and all Γ is C’
(Fogelin, p. 151). On this reading of proposition (1), according to de Morgan, it
is contradicted by one of either proposition (6) or (vii), which we may here give
not as in the illustrative propositions given in Hamilton’s Table 2 but, to conform
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to the letter symbols used in proposition (1), as follows: (6), ‘some Γs are not
Cs’; (vii), ‘some Cs are not Γs’ — these are, for de Morgan, the contradictories of
proposition (1), ‘All C is all Γ’ (de Morgan, p. 257). To be sure, as is clearly seen
simply by comparing figure 1 (illustrating proposition (1)) and figure 4 (illustrating
propositions (6) and (vii)), both (6) and (vii) must stand in a negative relation to
proposition (1). In a helpful but somewhat complex and possibly inaccurate table,
Hamilton asserts that (6) and (vii) stand as what he calls unilateral contraries of
(1) — this seems to suggest that he would accept that (6) and (vii) do severally
contradict (1). However, as contraries neither (6) nor (vii) properly constitute a
contradiction of (1) (see, NA.LL.II.284). Now, it might at first sight seem odd
that neither Fogelin nor (in his original critique of Hamilton) de Morgan, mention
proposition (v) as the contradictory of (1), since, translating this into symbols
consistent with (1) and in line with de Morgan’s reading, proposition (v) should
be read as stating ‘No C is Γ’ and indeed, to be consistent with de Morgan’s
translation of proposition (1), he ought to have translated this as ‘No C is Γ and
No Γ is C’. However, de Morgan does mention proposition (v) in a later footnote
as being offered as the contradictory of (1) by ‘an eminent defender’ (Mansel) of
Hamilton’s system (de Morgan, p. 258n1). But de Morgan brushes this aside as
not being ‘in the system’. Quite what de Morgan means by this is rather unclear,
especially since as Fogelin points out, ‘de Morgan is just wrong in suggesting that
the system of propositions do not pair up into proper contradictories’, and he goes
on to list, (1) and (8); (ii) and (vii); (3) and (6); (iv) and (v) as contradictory pairs.
But still, it may seem puzzling why (1) Toto-total coinclusion and (v) Toto-total
coexclusion should not be thought of as contradictories. Proposition (v)’s relation
to (1), is displayed in one place by Hamilton in such a way as to suggest that (v)
and (1) mutually contradict one another (see NA.LL.II.286). However, in another
place Hamilton gives their relation as one of bilateral contraries — this is to say
that both the Toto-total coinclusion of the terms in (1) as shown in figure 1 of
Table 2, and the Toto-total coexclusion of the terms in (v) as shown in figure 3
of Table 2, stand not as contradictories of one another but both potentially false;
which is of course to say, that if (1) is true though (v) must be false and vice
versa, since (1) and (v) may both be false they are not strictly, or existentially,
contradictories (see NA.LL.II.284).
Be all that as it may, as Fogelin rightly points out, the trouble lies with proposi-
tion (8) which de Morgan rejects as having no contradictory within the system. To
establish against de Morgan’s rejection of proposition (8) that Hamilton’s system
is comprehensive and not inconsistent, we need to be able to answer the ques-
tion: what is the true contradictory of (8) in the system? This is an important
question since if there is no contradictory of (8) within the system, de Morgan is
right to assert that it has not been generated from any necessary laws of thought
but rather by, as de Morgan so derisorily claims, on the basis of ‘an arbitrary
extension of the application of language’ (de Morgan, p. 258n1). However, as inti-
mated above, Fogelin ably answers de Morgan’s rejection of (8) by arguing that its
true contradictory is (1). Incidentally, although de Morgan can be fulsome in his
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praise of Hamilton — but then so can Mill — de Morgan’s treatment of Hamilton’s
quantification scheme is at times rather scurrilously worded. It would seem that
both de Morgan and Mill were, rather excessively, much given to resort to more
or less veiled abusive ad hominem attacks on Hamilton, and I cannot help but
comment here that while Hamilton’s frequent denunciations of others, including
de Morgan, must have to some extent provoked such responses, his achievements
and reputation as a logician have most certainly suffered unduly from the cheap
rhetorical tricks of opponents whose conduct ought to have been exemplarily fair,
not solely as a mark of respect for Hamilton’s considerable endeavours but also as
a generally more virtuous way of conducting their discourse — paradoxically, it
would seem that rather too often winning the argument is much more important
to those who should be most concerned with striving to resolve it satisfactorily.
Fogelin’s defence of Hamilton is an incisive attempt to redress the balance and
although I shall not rehearse the full extent of his critical examination of Hamil-
ton’s system, to date it stands as one of the strongest defences of Hamilton’s
quantification of the predicate. Fogelin’s defence is carried out in part by translat-
ing the controversial proposition (8), which de Morgan also claims with complete
disdain was erroneously, and, so he implies, foolishly offered by one of Hamilton’s
defenders as the true contradictory of (1) (de Morgan, p. 259n3). As Fogelin
rightly says about proposition (8), ‘it is this proposition that has been the con-
stant source of confusion’ (Fogelin, 151). However, as Fogelin rightly attempts to
show in his first article on Hamilton’s quantification, proposition (8) is indeed the
true contradictory of proposition (1). But, Fogelin’s second article on Hamilton
makes an important correction to his first attempt to establish that proposition
(8) genuinely contradicts proposition (1), and it is therefore to this second article
that I shall now refer.
According to Fogelin’s reading of proposition (1) this should be interpreted as:
‘Anything that is an A is identical with anything that is a B’ — which ‘means
that there is but one thing that is an A, one thing that is a B, and these things
are identical’ (Fogelin, p. 167). This is to say, as Fogelin argues, that de Morgan’s
interpretation of proposition (1) — ‘All A is B and all B is A’ — is wrong.
However, de Morgan was right in his interpretation of proposition (8) and hence
(8) can be stated as ‘Some A is not some B’, which may then be translated as the
contradictory of (1) as: ‘Something that is an A is not identical with something
that is a B’. Fogelin goes on to demonstrate just how this interpretation renders a
certain syllogism (which on his previous interpretation of proposition (8) is invalid),
can be shown to be valid using his second (and de Morgan’s original) reading,
thereby proving that Hamilton’s system is ‘saved from inconsistency’ (Fogelin, p.
168). Although the relation of Hamilton’s quantification system to syllogisms is
of course important, instead of looking at this I want to enrich Fogelin’s argument
somewhat by considering his interpretation of proposition (1) as meaning ‘that
there is but one thing that is an A, one thing that is a B, and these things are
identical’.
To return to Hamilton’s own example, ‘All Triangle is all Trilateral’: as express-
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ing the relation of Toto-total coinclusion, this expresses the nearest thing (along
with Toto-total coexclusion) Hamilton would call an absolute, which is to say that
the subject and predicate terms are co-inclusively related as maximally similar
such that they may be said to be absolutely convertible one with the other — they
are thus absolutely reciprocal. Whatever, if anything, might be said to differentiate
‘all Triangle’ from ‘all Trilateral’, such that they can be clearly if not distinctly
separated into two entities (and this may merely be that the terms themselves are
different signs both of which signify the same single entity), as two terms brought
into a mutual relation of coidentity, this coinclusion is nonetheless one in which all
material difference has been abstracted from thought, such that the co-identities
are indeed absolute and the proposition that articulates this is thus effectually an
implicit denial of their non-identity. Hence, such propositions asserting Toto-total
coinclusion that involve merely a terminal differential assert a co-identity between
two terms, and as such these propositions can be most directly contradicted by
the assertion of the most minimal difference in their quantity, since with regard to
their quantity alone their co-identification implies a unity or singularity — hence
the assertion of parti-partial coexclusion in proposition (8) is this most direct
contradiction of the unity expressed by proposition (1) in terms of two unities
being co-identical, since the very ground of (1) being the expression of absolute
identity is at once negated by proposition (8)’s assertion that the co-identities are
co-excluding.
But, we need to keep in mind that, for Hamilton, there is no absolute exclusion
in that relation between concepts known as Exclusion. Since he rejects absolute
exclusion, but also since Hamilton so permeates his system with correlations of
one sort or another, it seems fair to regard his system as ultimately one in which,
as there can be no absolute exclusion, there can also be no absolute inclusion or
perfect identity/unity. Rather, the universals of, say, the Toto-total Coinclusion
proposition (1), as relating at least two terms together, are assertions of either:
an approximate (adequate) but non-maximal co-identification; or, an absolute co-
identification that is total, but only to the extent that the subject and predicate
being equated in the proposition rely upon some merely nominal/terminal dif-
ferential. For Hamilton it would seem that some differential is the minimum
requirement for any concept, judgment, or reasoning to be possible, whether this
differential is actual (thus rendering the universal approximate), or is so crucially
dependent upon the merely terminal as to render all other distinction between
them impossible. Even when proposition (1) may seem to be an affirmation or
assertion of perfect identity, for (1) to exist as a proposition or material expression
of the unity of thought in which A is identified with B, it must consist of at least
two entities. As such, ‘All A is all B’ is most directly contradicted by the assertion
of the sole proposition that most adequately breaches or contradicts the relation
of coinclusion affirmed by ‘All A is all B’. For (1) and (8) to be contradictories,
the ‘all’ in (1) quantifies both subject and predicate as individuals absolutely co-
identified (though the ‘absolute’ here, must involve some differential), while the
‘some’ in (8) must quantify the subject and predicate of (8) to be at least the
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individuals referred to in (1) also, which (8) must then be asserting are coexclu-
sive to an extent beyond the necessary differential making (1) possible, such that
these individuals in (8), contradicting (1), may be said to be co-exclusive. The
contradictory of proposition (1), as before, is hence the assertion of Parti-partial
Coexclusion in proposition (8), ‘Some A is not some B’, or as Fogelin interprets
this, ‘Something that is an A is not identical with something that is a B′.
Now, the unity of A and B’s coinclusion or co-identification in thought, being
expressed as a coinclusion relationship between the two terms ‘A’ and ‘B’, is the
expression of a bringing into unity concepts which, as Hamilton took much trou-
ble to explain in his Lectures, are themselves relative, since a concept consists of
disparate entities thought as one by means of the degree of resemblance between
their several attributes — this is why in the bulk of actual cases of proposition
(1) expressing Toto-total coinclusion we need to think of their co-identity as ap-
proximate. However, the best examples of proposition (1) may be thought of as
propositions in which the subject and predicate terms are concepts or singulari-
ties/individuals in which constituents that respectively define them, which is to
say their Intensive quantities, are not mere bundles of pluralities possibly thought
erroneously or merely approximately as constituting two unities. Instead, in a
best example case of proposition (1) the subject and predicate terms will be con-
stituted by attributes that so overlap or co-inform one another in meaning that
they comprise what one might just as well call a true whole, a whole the parts of
which are as notions involving and involved. Thus, the Intensive quantities of both
the subject term and the predicate term in a best case example of proposition (1)
will be involuted wholes, which are in turn related to one another by Involution
to form what we might call a true whole. Such true wholes are best exemplified
by a priori truths in which each of the terms is involved and involving in each
other. Now, while this may not be fully satisfactory, some such extrapolation from
at least Hamilton’s notion of involution and some other elements of his work on
Logic, seem to go a long way to justify Fogelin’s reading of the real meaning of
proposition (1), namely, that it is the assertion that there is but one thing that
is an A, and one thing that is a B, and these things are identical. The unities
co-identified in a best example case of proposition (1), as involuted wholes, them-
selves both involved and involving one another, bespeak the nearest true whole or
unity that Hamilton can admit into his system. Hence, the only possible and most
efficient and immediate contradiction of the coidentity of A and B, yet again, must
be the assertion of Parti-partial coexclusion between ‘A’ and ‘B’ as expressed in
proposition (8), for this is not to find a mere single exception within A or B that is
not a co-identical attribute of both, but rather this is to declare the non-identity or
co-exclusion of the two things that are A and B, and thus (8) is the contradiction
of the unity that proposition (1) asserts.
However, this story, complicated enough, is not fully resolved yet. For exam-
ple, it is interesting to note that Hamilton himself lists propositions (1) and (8)
as Compossible using both senses of ‘some’, which is to say, that they are not
contradictory of one another — I say ‘lists’ but intriguingly compossibility is ex-
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pressed by means of blanks (empty spaces) in the relevant columns of Hamilton’s
‘Table of the Mutual Relations of the Eight Propositional Forms’. However, since
a footnote mentions possible inaccuracies, I am not sure whether one can fully
trust this table, nor really what its true status is, since, for one thing, it refers to
‘Generals Only’, which may suggest a differentiation within the universal proposi-
tions to accommodate what we might call a posteriori or approximate universals
as contrasted with a priori or absolute universals (see NA.LL.II.284). However,
assuming that propositions (1) and (8) are compossible, hence not contradictories,
does this not entirely overturn Fogelin’s strong defence of Hamilton’s system as
being consistent and, though partially interpreted aright by de Morgan, crucially
misinterpreted and therefore wrongly and, one might add, unfairly dismissed by
de Morgan?
First of all, a couple of simple yet weak answers to this: leaving aside the
possibility that I am blundering here, Hamilton’s table may simply be wrong and
maybe he did intend (1) and (8) to be contradictories as Fogelin infers; and,
Hamilton, de Morgan, and the seeming controversy that surrounded the meaning
and place of (8) may have jointly misled Fogelin into thinking that Hamilton
intended (1) and (8) to stand as contradictories. I shall take sides with Hamilton
and Fogelin here: Hamilton is not mistaken to class (8) as compossible with (1)
and Fogelin’s interpretation of (8) as the contradictory of (1) does indeed not only
render Hamilton’s thorough quantification of the predicate for both affirmatives
and negatives consistent, it also makes sense within the context of several other
aspects of Hamilton’s philosophical approach to logic.
However, this still leaves one problem: how can Hamilton be right to class (1)
and (8) as compossible if they are to be regarded as contradictories? I think a
lengthy answer could be offered, but I shall here merely intimate something of what
this might be: whatever (8) is, it must be, for Hamilton, the expression of some
one of two different species of Indefinitude. As such, though in one interpretation
— the interpretation given by Fogelin — (8) does contradict (1), if (8) is to remain
a Negative Particular (Indefinite Definitude/Definite Indefinitude) as the regular
scheme of universal and particular permutations in Table 2 above determines it
must be, then it cannot be typed or classified as the contradiction of (1), even
though it can be interpreted as functioning as (1)’s contradiction. For, while
it may operate in some instances and be used within a syllogism as if it is the
contradictory of (1), as soon as it in fact loses its Particular status and becomes
either an individual or a universal in both quantities — as soon as we know that
its terms have to be quantified as universal/individual (hence definite), it must
suddenly be transformed into proposition (v), ‘Any A is not any B’/‘No A is any
B’ — and of course, were we able to introduce only partial definitude (8) would
similarly metamorphose into either (6) or (vii).
Proposition (8), though berated by de Morgan and arguably jarring with gram-
matical norms or certain delicacies of taste, as each and every one of Hamilton’s
eight propositions do, quickly makes sense when illustrated with a Venn diagram.
Still, since it seems rather too easily open to misinterpretation, it is vulnerable to
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being regarded as a rather unnatural looking thing. Viewed in one way, it seems
to have an almost spectral appearance — and yet, a logically necessary component
in a schema that must be eightfold, it turns out to be a useful container within
Hamilton’s edifice for holding an indefinite quantity that, once grasped, functions
as it needs to do within Hamilton’s thorough system of quantification.
Proposition (8) may appear to be unimportant, unnatural, odd, irrelevant, even
spectral in its meaning, but it nonetheless expresses a relation of partial coex-
clusion concerning two Particular (indefinite) quantities that can operate as the
contradiction of a Toto-total coinclusion relation between the two wholes asserted
as co-identical in proposition (1). But if proposition (8) strikes us as at once
functionally comprehensible and yet strange, so also is proposition (1) since it
seems to bespeak a unity of duality, the enouncement of an absolute or singularity
only possible by comparing two things and asserting that they are one, perfectly
convertible with one another but, excepting the propositional requirement of a
terminal difference, in all respects the same thing. But if proposition (1) enounces
a notion akin to Leibniz’s principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, it is easy
to regard its contradiction in (8) as being akin to a notion of infinite divisibility
— some of this, is not some of that, but as, to contradict (1), this is the assertion
that what is an absolute whole may be distinguished into at least two parts, what
we seem to have between (1) and (8) is the clash between absolute and infinite
that first brought Hamilton fame with his controversial and yet highly potent and
profoundly influential Law of the Conditioned.
5 THE SYLLOGISM: SOME IMPLICATIONS
The science now shines out in the true character of beauty,–as One at
once and Various. Logic thus accomplishes its final destination; for as
‘Thrice-greatest Hermes,’ speaking in the mind of Plato, has expressed
it — ‘The end of Philosophy is the intuition of Unity.’ (NA.LL.II.252)
Hamilton’s treatment of the syllogism deserves a whole chapter in its own right —
I shall only be able to deal with it rather briefly in this section. In the Lectures
Hamilton takes a considerable amount of time to explain many detailed aspects of
the syllogism to his students. He distinguishes and displays four different classes
of syllogism — the Categorical, Disjunctive, Hypothetical, and the Hypothetico-
disjunctive (see LL.I.291-2). The categorical syllogism is also displayed in both
Extensive and Intensive forms, something he will later capture in his symbolic
notion as indicted in Table 2 earlier and as fully detailed in the final table of the
second volume of Lectures (LL.I.295-300). Importantly, in drawing attention to the
different reasonings between Extensive and Intensive syllogisms, where the copula
signifies respectively ‘contains under’ and ‘contains in’, Hamilton makes the point
that from what can be observed of the inverse ratio relation between Extension
and Intension with regard to syllogisms, ‘it is not to the mere external arrangement
of the terms, but to the nature of their relation, that we must look in determining
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the character of the syllogism’ (LL.I.300; and compare, p. 348). This is hugely
important to how he will proceed to regard the syllogism within the lectures but
it also bears within it the necessity of quantifying the predicate, even though at
this stage he does not seem to have produced the full system of quantification as
given in Table 2 earlier. With Extensive and Intensive syllogisms differentiated,
Hamilton constructs three rules, in place of Whately’s six, for Extensive, and three
for Intension which merely invert the Extensive rules and thus are the correlatives
of the rules for Extensive syllogisms (see LL.I.305-6; 315).
In all this we can see Hamilton working, as it were, from the ground up — as we
shall see shortly, his ultimate position will be even more simple or general as, on the
basis of his thoroughgoing quantification system, he develops a single general rule
or Canon governing all valid syllogisms in both affirmative and negative moods.
With regard to what is happening in the Lectures it is therefore important to
remember both their instructional function and that some aspects in the Lectures
are later superseded, such as, for example, his later rejection of the Rule of Reason
and Consequent in favour of just three main Rules of Identity, non-Contradiction,
and Excluded middle (see LL.I.290n).
In his treatment of the syllogism in the Lectures, Hamilton introduces his stu-
dents to the usual suspects: the four figures, moods, the ingenious mnemonics of,
for example, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, the formal fallacies, and so on, a great deal
of which he lays out with painstaking detail (see LL.I.394-468). He also discusses
the various forms of conversion, but since I have already touched on this subject in
the previous section and how Hamilton’s quantification effectually displaces other
kinds of conversion with his simple conversion, it is needless to say anything more
about his treatment of it in the Lectures (see LL.I.262-5; NA.LL.II.264-76). Using
simple circle diagrams to illustrate the relations between the extremes or subject
and predicate terms of the conclusion and the middle term, his explanations of
syllogisms must have given his students an excellent grounding in the differing
figures and moods. However, as so often occurs in Hamilton’s expositions of the
traditional logic, he marks some significant differences between his treatment and
that of both his predecessors and contemporaries. One major example of this is
his rejection of the fourth figure which is, of course, simply shown, in Extension,
as follows:
P is M
M is S
S is P
He argues that, though the fourth figure can be shown to be valid, ‘the logicians,
in consequence of their exclusive recognition of the reasoning in extension, were
not in possession of the means of showing that this figure is a monster undeserving
of toleration, far less of countenance and favour’ (LL.I.424). I shall not rehearse
Hamilton’s arguments against the fourth figure, except to note that he shows
that in this figure there is an unwarranted switch from reasoning in Extension to
Intension or vice versa and thus it performs ‘a feat about as reasonable and useful
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in Logic, as the jumping from one horse to another would be reasonable and useful
in the race-course. Both are achievements possible; but, because possible, neither
is, therefore, a legitimate exercise of skill’ (LL.I.427). But, Hamilton’s principal
reason for rejecting the fourth figure is that it involves a mental process ‘which is
not overtly expressed’ — in other words, when we adhere rigidly to the principle of
explicitness, the fourth figure’s reliance upon an intermediary conclusion becomes
evident (see LL.I.427-8).
There are many other interesting features in the lectures worth mentioning,
such as his treatment of the difference between Induction and Deduction, which I
briefly touched on in Section 2 above. He discards what is now much more typ-
ically classed as Inductive argument, instead regarding Deduction and Induction
both as formal forms of demonstrative reasoning — logicians had ‘corrupted and
confounded’ logical deduction ‘governed by the necessary laws of thought’ with
contingent matter and probability (LL.I.325; and see 319–26). This formal ap-
proach, according to Hamilton, is more in keeping with Aristotle’s understanding
of induction (see LL.I.325–6). It also has important implications for how Hamilton
regards both the Sorites and Enthymeme, both of which he discusses in terms of
their formal characters as syllogisms. He does of course explain that the Sorites
became associated with that sophism or informal fallacy commonly referred to or
illustrated by means of the examples of piling up grains of sand until what was
once maintained to be a small quantity becomes large (a Progressive Sorites), and
also the famous bald man example (Regressive Sorites) (see LL.I.376–8; 464–6).
According to Hamilton, the Sorites only became associated with such sophistic
or fallacious reasoning some time in the 15th century and the failure of logicians
to incorporate the Sorites as a legitimate chain-syllogism was all down to their
exclusive concentration on Extension and not keeping in mind that, for Aristotle
‘all our general knowledge is only an induction from an observation of particulars’
(LL.I.377; 380; and see, 366–85).
His treatment of the Enthymeme is similarly interesting and informative, ar-
guing that it is only the external form of the enthymeme that may be said to be
imperfect or incomplete. As Hamilton rightly shows, an enthymeme is not merely
an argument in which one of the premises is missing or suppressed; it may also
be that the conclusion has been suppressed/omitted. But, whether the major or
minor premise or the conclusion is not made explicit, this does not, for Hamilton,
warrant calling an enthymeme a special or defective syllogism — it ‘constitutes no
special form of reasoning’, nor did Aristotle maintain that it did (LL.I.387). The
enthymeme illustrates an important principle that pervades so much of Hamilton’s
approach to logic, namely, that the mere verbal accident of elision (or in the case of
the enthymeme we might say more or less deliberate omission, often serving pur-
poses of persuasion which Hamilton somewhat oddly does not address directly)
is something that the logician, in staunchly adhering to the principle of explicit-
ness, can make explicit as something that is in thought, though not in expression
(for Hamilton’s treatment of the enthymeme, see LL.I.386-94). He provides some
nice examples of enthymemes but I shall only quote one of these since it involves
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a nice quip against Hegel that suggests something of Hamilton’s capacity for at
least occasional touches of humour: ‘There is recorded [. . . ] a dying deliverance of
the philosopher Hegel, the wit of which depends upon [its] ambiguous reasoning.
‘Of all my disciples,’ he said, ‘one only understands my philosophy; and he does
not.’ But we may take this for an admission by the philosopher himself, that the
doctrine of the Absolute transcends human comprehension’ (LL.I.398). There is
in this also more than a hint of not only Hamilton’s opposition to Hegel but also
to absolutism more generally.
To his credit Hamilton reminds his students of certain points he made much
earlier in the lectures to do with the status of propositions with regard to their
discrete components, pointing out that a syllogism is an integrated mental act and
that it ought therefore to be thought of not in a merely mechanical manner:
It is [. . . ] altogether erroneous to maintain, as is commonly done,
that a reasoning or syllogism is a mere decompound whole, made up
of judgments; as a judgment is a compound whole, made up of con-
cepts. This is a mere mechanical mode of cleaving the mental phe-
nomena into parts; and holds the same relation to a genuine analysis
of mind which the act of the butcher does to that of the anatomist.
It is true, indeed, that a syllogism can be separated into three parts
or propositions; and that these propositions have a certain meaning,
when considered apart, and out of relation to each other. But when
thus considered, they lose the whole significance which they had when
united in a reasoning; for their whole significance consisted in their
reciprocal relation,–in the light which they mutually reflected on each
other. We can certainly hew down an animal body into parts, and con-
sider its members apart; but these, though not absolutely void of all
meaning, when viewed singly and out of relation to their whole, have
lost the principal and peculiar significance which they possessed as the
coefficients of a one organic and indivisible whole. It is the same with
a syllogism. The parts which, in their organic union, possessed life and
importance, when separated from each other, remain only enunciations
of vague generalities, or of futile identities. Though, when expressed
in language, it be necessary to analyse a reasoning into parts, and to
state these parts one after another, it is not to be supposed that in
thought one notion, one proposition, is known before or after another;
for, in consciousness, the three notions and their reciprocal relations
constitute only one identical and simultaneous cognition. (LL.I.275-6).
The notion of interrelation and simultaneity in the above is important to how
Hamilton will go on to view the syllogism’s structure as, for example, something
in which it is only mere convention that always places the conclusion last, and
that the relative positions of major and minor premise themselves can easily be
switched around without any loss of meaning. However, I have quoted the above
passage at length since it eloquently apprises us of an important general dimension
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of Hamilton’s whole approach to Logic — for all that he is striving for a rigorously
pure science free from the extra-logical and although he will later in the ‘New
Analytic’ speak of a ‘Symbolic Notation [that will display] the propositional and
syllogistic forms, even with a mechanical simplicity’, Hamilton constantly opposes
the mechanical or rigidly structural in favour of considering the syllogism less like
a dismembered material body or constructed building and more like a process —
multiplex, organic, interrelated, and even fluid — and his logic needs to be seen
as an attempt to capture, not only the dual perspectives afforded by Extension
and Intension, but also a greater sense of the richness and complexity of formal
reasoning (NA.LL.II.251).
In the previous section I referred to Hamilton’s ‘Observations on the Mutual
Relation of Syllogistic Terms in Quantity and Quality’ at Appendix V (e) in the
Lectures on Logic (see NA.LL.II.285). In this ‘Observations’ section, he provides
the relations between any given proposition’s subject and predicate terms and,
by inverting the order of the negative propositional forms given in the previous
section in Table 2, he displays the best-worst quantification relationships between
each of the four affirmative propositions and their corresponding negatives (see
NA.LL.II.286). I have reconfigured Hamilton’s presentation of these relations as
follows:
The significance of this schema becomes clear when we note how Hamilton’s
system of quantification brings into consideration certain aspects of syllogistic
reasoning formerly ignored by Aristotelian logic. According to Hamilton:
Former logicians knew only of two worse relations,–a particular, worse
than a universal, affirmative, and a negative worse than an affirma-
tive. As to a better and worse in negatives, they knew nothing; for
as two negative premises were inadmissible, they had no occasion to
determine which of two negatives was the worse or better. But in
quantifying the predicate, in connecting positive and negative moods,
and in generalising a one supreme canon of syllogism, we are compelled
to look further, to consider the inverse procedures of affirmation and
negation, and to show [. . . ] how the latter, by reversing the former,
and turning the best quantity of affirmation into the worst of negation,
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annuls all restriction, and thus apparently varies the quantity of the
conclusion. (NA.LL.II.285-6).
I shall not attempt to explain this in detail. Suffice to say that the above schema
of best-worst quantification relationships is used by Hamilton to construct what
he calls his ‘General Canon’ to determine the relationship between the subject (S)
and predicate (P) of the conclusion in a syllogism, on the basis of a best-worse
comparison between the relationships between the subject term and middle term
(M), and the middle term and predicate term of the syllogism. Hence, depending
on the relationship between the subject and predicate terms of a syllogism, the
relationship between S and P in the conclusion will be, for example, totally coex-
clusive, or partially coexclusive, or toto-partially coexclusive, and so on. Hamilton’s
‘one supreme canon of syllogism’ is given as follows:
General Canon. What worst relation of subject and predicate, subsists
between either of two terms and a common third term, with which
one, at least, is positively related; that relation subsists between the
two terms themselves. (NA.LL.II.285)
He translates this ‘General Canon’ into twelve clear rules governing 36 syllogistic
moods in the first three figures (the fourth figure having been rejected as pointed
out above), plus 24 negative moods — these forms are detailed in the final table
given at the end of the Lectures on Logic (see LL.II.475). However, it might be
better to think of these not as rules but rather as instantiations of his General
Canon since, once one has grasped how Hamilton’s system operates, each of them
can be translated from this Canon with relative ease (see NA.LL.II.285-9). I shall
not discuss these instantiations in any detail but will instead use just one of them
to illustrate how Hamilton’s General Canon operates, using an example which
Fogelin uses to demonstrate the correctness of his reading of propositions (1) and
(8) as discussed in the previous section.
Fogelin gives the following syllogism as an example that he claims Hamilton’s
system allows as valid, yet which can be shown, using a Venn diagram, to be
invalid if translated using his earlier translation of proposition (8), though valid
using de Morgan’s interpretation of this parti-partial coexclusion proposition:
Some P is not any M
Some S is some M
∴ Some S is not some P
Having already accepted Fogelin’s treatment of the above syllogism which shows
how it can be read as valid (and hence what proposition (8) expressing Parti-
partial coexclusion means, or can be read as meaning), all I want to do here is
merely illustrate how Hamilton’s General Canon can be invoked to produce from
the two premises the conclusion as given. I think that all this will demonstrate is
that Fogelin is right that the above syllogism would be declared valid in Hamilton’s
system as he asserts. However, I am not entirely sure that Hamilton’s table and list
of interpretations of his General Canon are completely free from anomalies, and it
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must be said that to check this thoroughly, given the complexities of co-ordinating
various mixtures of Extensive and Intensive readings with Hamilton’s own symbolic
representation of the negative moods, is beyond the scope of this chapter. Hence,
I shall simply give Fogelin’s example as unequivocally exemplifying adherence to
Hamilton’s General Canon, even though by treating this so simplistically I may be
overlooking certain niceties and complexities concerning how it ought to be used:
Fogelin’s Example: Relation: Hamilton’s rule from
General Canon:
some P is not any M Parti-total coexclusion VII.a: A term
parti-totally coexclusive,
and a term partially
coinclusive, of a third
[M], are partially
coexclusive of each other.
(NA.LL.II.288)
some S is some M Parti-partial conclusion
some S is not some P Parti-partial coexclusion
From what I have been so far able to ascertain, though not articulate in full,
certain possible anomalies (or doubts that I still have) notwithstanding, Hamilton’s
General Canon does seem to work.
If, in agreement with Fogelin, I am right about this, Hamilton’s system marks a
most significant advancement in the treatment of the syllogism that almost entirely
replaced the previous systems which Hamilton so often decried as being imperfect,
flawed, confused, and misleading. No wonder that Fogelin, though acknowledging
that Hamilton’s achievement may not seem important ‘from a modern point of
view’, regards his quantification system as ‘a radical departure from traditional
theory’ (Fogelin, pp. 163–4). If Hamilton’s ultimate regulation or General Canon
of syllogistic forms is fully adequate, comprehensive, sufficiently general, and flex-
ible, his treatment of the syllogism arguably marks the considerable improvement
on and replacement of traditional logic’s treatment of the syllogism that he himself
believed it did. In place of numerous logical rules and botched attempts to bring
the Aristotelic system out of the chaos in which Hamilton found it, by judiciously
interpreting but not slavishly falling under the spell of Aristotle’s enormous au-
thority, Hamilton may well have developed, albeit within certain limitations, a
system of formal logic that, as it culminated in a simple mechanism for making
all quantities in both affirmative and negative propositions explicit, only required
the capstone of his single or supreme canon of the syllogism, to warrant his grand
claim that he had produced a system whose beauty resided in the very naturalness
of being ‘as One at once and Various.’
6 CONCLUSION
A mere knowledge of the rules of Rhetoric can no more enable us to
compose well, than a mere knowledge of the rules of Logic can enable
us to think well. (LL.I.48-9)
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Augustus de Morgan deeply misunderstood the complexities that Hamilton’s sys-
tem could either accommodate or was pointing towards. As Fogelin claims, though
de Morgan clearly did try to understand Hamilton’s system ‘he failed to do so and
commentators since have hardly done better’ (Fogelin, p. 162). According to
Fogelin this has much to do with the strangeness of Hamilton’s language, such
as we find in his non-standard exchanges of ‘all’ for ‘any’. True, these things
do create problems, as also do Hamilton’s now strange symbolism, dense tables,
and the fragmentary nature of much of his work on Logic, excepting the Lectures
which are abundantly clear, always informative, and even occasionally somewhat
entertaining. However, I suspect that the linguistic difficulties have more to do
with Hamilton’s enormous ability to compress the language of his texts into an
often overly taut, quasi-litigious style that is at first off-putting and certainly at
times not for the faint-hearted. However, there are some more substantial reasons
why de Morgan and others have floundered and in the end did Hamilton a great
disservice.
In order to gain more that a foothold in Hamilton’s logic it would seem that
one also has to have a foothold in and possibly be to some extent persuaded by
his metaphysical standpoint of natural dualism, for in this doctrine’s opposition
to absolutism — not least of all in its opposition to absolute scepticism — inheres
Hamilton’s relativity and the germ of what becomes a much more pervasive cor-
relativism throughout so much of his writing. Hamilton’s relativity places subject
and predicate into simple relations of equation and non-equation, distinguishes
indefinite quantities into two kinds or degrees of indefiniteness, and is founded
on recognising the significance of perspective with regard to a given concept’s
dual quantification dimensions of extension and intension. All this seems to be
an attempt to frame subject and predicate as the unity of thought from which
they originate. However, the frame is really much larger, and herein lies a great
part of the problem and yet potential of Hamilton’s system. A part of Hamil-
ton’s relativism also brings into play not just perspective (and thereby different
possible readings of propositions), but both the relations between a concept’s at-
tributes and the conditioning nature of the human subject’s agency. The relations
between logic (the laws that constitute the conditions of thought) and language
(the terms without which we would otherwise be incapable of participating in any
productive thought, argument, discourse, analysis, or articulation of logic’s laws,
propositional forms, and so on), and the surrounding chaos or ever-shifting sands
against, and yet in relation to which, logic and language comprise our attempts
to make whole, divide, and recombine this otherwise unintelligible plenum of in-
determinate entities under which we are continually at risk of being submerged
— as these relations form the frame or field within which Hamilton’s logic is con-
ducted, he was constructing a logical system both highly suggestive of a deeper
relativism he eschewed, and yet which he virtually postulated was the condition
within which logic had to operate as the very function of logic and language had
to do with stabilising the multiple within unity. This, perhaps more than anything
else, makes his writing complex. However, much more simply, Hamilton’s enor-
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mous erudition — also a factor in the diversity he attempts to bring into order
— remains an intimidating force that few, excepting some of his more devoted
students and followers, have found a congenial companion.
Hamilton regarded philosophy — particularly logic and metaphysics — as the
greatest gymnastic of the mind and with such a conception of his subject matter
providing a large part of philosophy’s raison d’eˆtre, he was attempting to set his
students on a course of study that would challenge their intellectual abilities to
their utmost through his attempts to make the study of Logic measure up to and
(it must have been his hope) compete with the higher educational, intellectual,
and scholarly standards that had been demanded on the Continent. The Ger-
man logicians in particular, made even the Professors of Britain’s one-time most
prestigious university, Oxford, appear to Hamilton’s eyes as little better than in-
tellectual philistines or dilettantes. In his definition of Logic as a pure science of
the necessary laws of thought, single-handedly Hamilton was laying the ground-
work for improving upon and in many ways replacing the traditional Aristotelian
logic that he regarded as having been sunk into a mass of confusion by centuries
of almost slavish or insufficiently critical adherence to the Stagirite, coupled with
numerous misinterpretations of the true nature of their subject.
Within the boldness of Hamilton’s emphatic assertions and robust denunciations
of the errors and confusions that he argues arose due to ‘the passive sequacity of
the logicians [in following] obediently in the footsteps of their great master’, Aris-
totle, there is a genuine sense of his excitement concerning this claim that his
system supersedes all previous systems new and old (NA.LL.II.262). By this stage
in his work on logic it must have seemed to Hamilton as though, after many long
years of arduous industry during which he had been diligently examining, sum-
marising, and critically assessing the logics of others written mainly in Greek,
Latin, English, and German, at last the numerous errors and confusions riddling
centuries of Aristotelian logic could be removed. Through the earlier works of
ancient and scholastic logicians, these errors and confusions had continued to sift
themselves, but they also permeated the work of his Oxonian contemporaries.
But now, after years of clearing away the detritus of former ages and chastising
the dilettantism of more recent logicians, he could with one final push radically
brush aside those aspects of the traditional logic that had significantly impeded
its development or evolution into a system at once more complex and yet more
orderly (see NA.LL.II.252). At last he had constructed a robust system that he
could proudly advocate as the ‘keystone in the Aristotelic Arch’, and while this
keystone had doubled the number of propositional forms, these forms constituted
a structural whole based on the logic of Aristotle and thus at once the tradi-
tional logic was brought one significant step closer to the beauty and perfection
which Aristotle’s work seemed to promise but had not realised (see NA.LL.II.249).
However, Fogelin rightly counters Hamilton’s claim that his ‘New Analytic’ com-
pletes traditional Aristotelian logic — for, instead of merely placing the keystone
in the Aristotelic arch, ‘By introducing an entirely different system of classifying
propositions in virtue of their potential roles in syllogisms, Hamilton made a rad-
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ical departure from traditional theory’ (Fogelin, p. 163). The keystone that is
Hamilton’s quantification of the predicate one might thus say, is far from being a
pretentious claim to glory undeserved — rather, Hamilton’s ‘keystone’ is an overly
modest description for a much more radical, yet substantial and more stable con-
struction that involved the destruction and removal of logical ruins from bygone
ages, though it is plain to see that at least some of the foundations were incorpo-
rated to support Hamilton’s arch. But with a final and fitting twist of irony, all
too quickly the course of logic would develop during the 19th century in ways that
left so much of Hamilton’s endeavour far behind as a curiously flawed relic.
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